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Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits,
with certain exceptions, discrimination on the basis of sex in any
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.' In addition, title IX authorizes and directs the federal
1. Education Amendments of 1972
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901, 20 U.S.C.
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1681 (Supp. IV, 1974). Title
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agencies responsible for administering the financial assistance to
effectuate the title's prohibition against sex discrimination by
IX of the cited statute is composed of seven sections, 09 901-907. Hereafter all citations
will be to the United States Code.
20 U.S.C. 0 1681 (Supp. IV, 1974) provides:
(a) Prohibition against discrimination; exceptions.
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,
except that:
(1) Classes of educational institutions subject to prohibition.
In regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall apply
only to institutions of vocational education, professional education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education;
(2) Educational institutions commencing planned changes in admissions.
In regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall not
apply (A) for one year from June 23, 1972, nor for six years after June 23, 1972,
in the case of an educational institution which has begun the process of changing
from being an institution which admits only students of one sex to being an
institution which admits students of both sexes, but only if it is carrying out a
plan for such a change which is approved by the Commissioner of Education or
(B) for seven years from the date an educational institution begins the process
of changing from being an institution which admits only students of one sex to
being an institution which admits students of both sexes, but only if it is carrying out a plan for such a change which is approved by the Commissioner of
Education, whichever is the later;
(3) Educational institutions of religious organizations with contrary religious
tenets.
This section shall not apply to an educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of this subsection would not
be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization;
(4) Educational institutions training individuals for military services or merchant marine.
This section shall not apply to an educational institution whose primary
purpose is the training of individuals for the military services of the United
States, or the merchant marine; and
(5) Public educational institutions with traditional and continuing admissions
policy.
In regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public institution
of undergraduate higher education which is an institution that traditionally and
continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students
of one sex; and
(6) Social fraternities or sororities; voluntary youth service organizations.
This section shall not apply to membership practices(A) of a social fraternity or social sorority which is exempt from taxation
under section 501(a) of Title 26, the active membership of which consists primarily of students in attendance a t an institution of higher education, or
(B) of the Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian
Association, Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, and voluntary youth
service organizations which are so exempt, the membership of which has traditionally been limited to persons of one sex and principally to persons of less than
nineteen years of age.

HEW'S REGULATION

promulgating regulation^.^ Exercising that rulemaking authority,
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) issued in June 1975, its final title IX r e g ~ l a t i o nFollowing
.~
review
(b) Preferential or disparate treatment because of imbalance in participation
or receipt of Federal benefits; statistical evidence of imbalance.
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to
require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment
to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in
or receiving the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any
community, State, section, or other area: Provided, That this subsection shall
not be construed to prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under
this chapter of statistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance
exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such
program or activity by the members of one sex.
(c) Educational institution defined.
For purposes of this chapter an educational institution means any public
or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an educational institution composed of more than one school, college, or department
which are administratively separate units, such term means each such school,
college, or department.
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. N ,1974) provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant,
loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized
and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect
to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general
applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the
statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action
is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and
until approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted
pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to
grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient
as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity
for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination
or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or
other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited
in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided,
however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency
concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply
with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured
by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant
or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed
pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file
with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over
the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and
the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty
days have elapsed after the filing of such report.
3. 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1975). The regulation was published in the June 4, 1975 edition of
the Federal Register. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975).
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by C o n g r e s ~the
, ~ regulation became effective July 21, 1975.5
Although
title
IX and HEW'S regulation raise several significant legal issues,l this comment identifies and evaluates only one:
4. See notes 60-74 and accompanying text infra.
5. 45 C.F.R. $ 86.1 (1975).
6. For example, title IX excepts private undergraduate schools from the requirement
not to discriminate in admissions; but the title includes within the scope of the prohibition
"professional" schools. 20 U.S.C. 8 1681(a)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974). There is an overlap
between the inclusion and the exclusion and hence a conflict that HEW attempted to
resolve in the regulation
With respect to coverage of admissions to institutions of professional and vocational education, the Secretary has interpreted the statute as excluding admissions coverage of professional and vocational programs offered a t private undergraduate schools. Thus, admission to programs leading to a first degree in fields
such as teaching, engineering, and architecture a t such private colleges will be
exempt under paragraph 86.15 (d). A number of comments were received urging
the Secretary to change his interpretation of the statute in this area. Even after
reassessing the Department's position on this issue, the Secretary believes that
Congress did not address the overlap between the term "professional" and the
term "undergraduate." Thus, the Secretary remains convinced that, while that
section of the statute pertaining to admissions might be read as including professional degrees wherever they are offered, the statute can also be read as
stating that admissions to private undergraduate schools were to be totally
exempt.
40 Fed. Reg. 24130 (1975).
Also, many women's organizations argued that HEW, through title IX regulations,
should monitor and censor sexism and sex stereotyping in textbooks, primers, and readers.
HEW declined the invitation on constitutional grounds:
As stated in the preamble to the proposed regulation, the Department recognizes that sex stereotyping in textbooks and curricular materials is a serious
matter. However, the imposition of restrictions in this area would inevitably
limit communication and would thrust the Department into the role of Federal
censor. There is no evidence in the legislative history that the proscription in
title IX against sex discrimination should be interpreted as requiring, prohibiting or limiting the use of any such material. Normal rules of statutory construction require the Department, wherever possible, to interpret statutory language
in such a way as to avoid potential conflicts with the Constitution. Accordingly,
the Department has construed title IX as not reaching textbooks and curricular
materials on the ground that to follow another interpretation might place the
Department in a position of limiting free expression in violation of the First
Amendment.
40 Fed. Reg. 24135 (1975). A feminist responded to this argument in these terms:
Sex bias in materials is one of the most serious kinds of bias in education,
probably among the most damaging. HEW has never backed up its argument
on the first amendment by a legal brief.
I think it should be noted we have looked very carefully a t the legal issues
since the NOW legal defense fund certainly does not want to win rights for
women a t the expense of us all. We concluded that in the area of public elementary and secondary education, that there is no first amendment bar to some kind
of coverage of textbooks which are already centrally selected by public school
officials, and in higher education I think there is a somewhat different question.
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Is HEW'S title IX regulation ultra vires, that is, does the regulation improperly extend or modify the will of Congress as expressed in title IX? In light of this restricted focus, the comment
is limited in two other important ways. First, the history and
scope of title IX and HEW'S regulation are considered only to the
extent that they illuminate the ultra vires issue. Second, this
comment does not enter into the debate over the wisdom and
desirability of the social policy decisions reflected in HEW'S title
IX regulation;? rather, it attempts only to determine whether the
regulation is inconsistent with the original title IX legislation or
otherwise conflicts with legal principle^.^

Two fundamental historical facts underlie passage of title IX
in 1972: (1) the national resurgence of the women's movement,
particularly among academic women, in the second half of the
1960's' and (2) the emergence and publication of evidence that
sex discrimination was widely practiced in American education.
We submitted a legal memorandum to HEW t o t h a t effect, and t h a t
[they?], unfortunately, have ignored it and have decided to go on without any
coverage a t all.
Hearings on Sex Discrimination and Sex Stereotyping in Vocational Education Before the
Subcomm. o n Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Educational of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1975) (Ms. Holly Knox, Director,
Project on Equal Education Right, National Organization of Women) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on Vocational Education]. The National Organization of Women (NOW)
memorandum referred to is reprinted a t 121 CONG.REC.S774-77 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1975).
7. A large portion of that debate is found in Hearings on Sex Discrimination Regulations Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited a s 1975 Hearings on Title
1X Regulation].
8. This comment is restricted in its inquiry to those principles and policies that would
be cognizable by a court reviewing the title IX regulation and exercising a proper measure
of judicial self-restraint.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has identified the limitations on judicial review of
administrative regulations in these terms:
In reviewing a legislative rule [promulgated by an agency] a court is free
to make three inquiries: (1)whether the rule is within the delegated authority,
(2) whether it is reasonable, and (3) whether it was issued pursuant to proper
procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule, for the legislative body, by its delegation to the agency,
has committed those questions to administrative judgment and not to judicial
judgment.
1 K. DAVIS,ADMINISTRATIVE
LAWTREATISE§ 5.05, a t 314-15 (1958).
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The Women's Movement and Higher Education

The resurgence of the women's movement in America generated a politically active and somewhat discrete submovement,
the academic women's movement, sufficiently self-interested to
take political and legal steps to eradicate sex discrimination in
American education. Academic women's groups, generally more
conservative and less radical than other feminist organizations,
effectively focused their political and legal efforts not on the
rights and advancement of women in general but rather on the
rights and status of women within academe?
Early legislation prohibiting sex discrimination, however,
provided academic women no legal tools with which to attack
discrimination in education. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964IRprohibited sex discrimination in employment, but educational institutions were expressly exempted from the coverage of
the title? The Equal Pay Act of 1963,12designed to counter "the
widespread and blatantly discriminatory practice of paying
women less than men for the same work,"13 likewise excluded
academic women from its coverage.14
9. For a general history of the academic women's movement and the political action
taken by academic women see Klotzburger, Political Action by Academic Women, in
ACADEMIC
WOMEN
ON THE MOVE359 (1973).
10. 78 Stat. 253 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (Supp. IV, 1974).
11. The original 5 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, provided that:
This title shall not apply to . . . an educational institution with respect to the
employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational
activities of such institution.
12. 29 U.S.C. 5 206(d) (1970). The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was an amendment to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970).
FOR
13. Murphy & Ross, Liberating Women-Legally Speaking, in WITHJUSTICE
SOME112 (1970); see B. BABCOCK,
A. FREEDMAN,
E. NORTON
& S. ROSS,SEXDISCRIMIN~TION
AND THE LAW440 (1975) [hereinafter cited as B. BABCOCK].
See generally Johnson, The
Equal Pay Act of 1963: A Practical Analysis, 24 DRAKEL. REV.570 (1975).
14. When Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 provided in pertinent part that:
The provisions of sections [206] and [207] of this title shall not apply with
respect to(1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional capacity . . . .
Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 9(a)(l), 75 Stat. 71, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). To clarify that this exception applied to
teachers, it was amended in 1966 by adding after "or professional capacity" the following:
"(including any employee employed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel
or teacher in elementary or secondary schools)." Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 5 214,80 Stat. 837 (1966), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (Supp.
IV, 1974).
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Indeed, prior to 1972, academic women's groups had only one
effective legal tool against sex discrimination in higher education-Executive Order No. 11,246.15 That order prohibits sexbased and other forms of discrimination in employment by employers, including colleges and universities,16 holding contracts
with the federal government. Once a contract is made, the entire
employing institution must comply with the nondiscriminatior,
requirements even though only one department is involved in
performing the contract.17 Also, the executive order requires affirmative action whenever necessary to remedy effects of past
discrimination. lA
The most prominent and active of the academic women's
groups, Women's Equity Action League (WEAL),I9conducted a
massive campaign against sex discrimination in education under
Executive Order No. 11,246. In January 1970, WEAL filed with
the Department of Labor a class action complaint against every
college and university in the United States. Other academic
women's groups soon followed WEAL'S example and brought
complaints against the nation's law schools and such individual
schools as Harvard. The Department of Labor delegated its investigative responsibilities to HEW, which, after some prodding,
responded to the charges with investigations of many of the col15. 3 C.F.R. 169 (1975), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
Executive Order No. 11,246 was first issued by President Johnson on September 28,
1965. It prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin,
but not sex. Pressure from women's groups, however, resulted in an amendment on October 17, 1967, extending the prohibition to sex discrimination. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3
C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 comp.) (effective October 13, 1968). All references in the text or
footnotes to Executive Order No. 11,246 are to the order as amended by Executive Order
No. 11,375.
One feminist, commenting on Executive Order No. 11,246, stated that, "[ulntil Title
VII was amended in March 1972, the Executive Order was the only remedy for discrimination against academic women." Sandler, A Little Help From Our Government: WEAI,
and Contract Compliance, in ACADEMIC
WOMENON THE MOVE439, 441 (1973) (emphasis
in original) [hereinafter cited as Sandler] .
For a discussion of the uses of Executive Order No. 11,246 as a legal tool against sex
bias see B. BABCOCK,
supra note 13, a t 509-59.
16. Most colleges and universities in America hold contracts, usually for research,
with the federal government and thus come within the scope of the order's prohibition.
Sandler 440.
510; Sandler 442.
17. B. BABCOCK
18. Sandler 441-42.
19. WEAL broke off from the National Organization of Women (NOW) in the fall of
1968. The split was prompted by a disagreement over the abortion issue. WEAL focuses
its "energies on legal and economic discrimination in education and employment and
makes a special effort to recruit women who already occupy positions of power." Freeman,
ON THE MOVE1,215 (1973).
Women on the Moue: The Roots of Revolt, in ACADEMIC
WOMEN
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leges and universities complained of by academic women's
groups. 20
These actions by academic women under Executive Order
No. 11,246 focused the attention of both the federal government
and the general public on sex discrimination in American higher
education and thereby served to prepare the political arena for
passage of title IX. WEAL'S complaints were accompanied by
extensive materials documenting and substantiating that group's
Further, the resulting investigations
charges of di~crimination.~'
of colleges and universities by federal agencies responsible for
enforcement of Executive Order No. 11,246 brought to public
attention additional evidence of sex bias in higher education.22

B. Evidence of Sex Discrimination in Higher Education
Congressional hearings in 1970 first served to widely publicize evidence of sex discrimination in American education.23
Those hearings, as well as subsequent studies, revealed a clear
pattern of discrimination against women students in admission
to higher education,24particularly to elite private universitie~.~~
Many witnesses and researchers also alleged discrimination in the
and in placeaward of financial aid to women,26in c~unseling,~'
20. The story of WEAL'S campaign and the parallel campaigns of other women's
groups under Executive Order No. 11,246 is recounted in detail in Sandler, supra note 15.
21. Id. a t 441.
22. Id. a t 448-50.
23. See Hearings on § 805 of H. R. 16098 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]. The charges, allegations, and evidence of discrimination in education presented a t the 1970 hearings are summarized and organized at
Murray, Economic and Educational Inequality Based on Sex: An Overview, 5 VAL.U.L.
REV.237, 247-70 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Murray].
Some scholars had completed and published studies on sex discrimination in acadDOCTORATE
IN
eme prior t o the 1970 congressional hearings, e.g., H. ASTIN,THEWOMAN
AMERICA
(1969); J. BERNARD,
ACADEMIC
WOMEN(1964); Bayer, College and University
Faculty: A Statistical Description, 5 ACE REP. (1970); Bayer & Astin, Sex Differences in
Academic Rank and Salary Among Science Doctorates in Teaching, 3 J . HUMAN
RESOURCES
191 (1968); Rossi, Status of Women in Graduate Departments of Sociology,
1968-1969, 5 AM. SOCIOLOGIST
1 (1970), but perhaps because of the scholarly nature of the
journals in which the studies appeared, they failed to attract wide public attention.
24. 1970 Hearings 643-47 (testimony of Dr. Peter Muirhead, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Associate Commissioner for Higher Education, Office of Education, HEW);
CANNEGIE
COMMISSION
ON HIGHEREDUCATION,
OPPORTUNITIES
FOR WOMENIN HIGHER
35-59 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE
REPORT];Roby, Institutional BarEDUCATION
WOMEN
ON THE MOVE
37, 38riers to Women Students in Higher Education, in ACADEMIC
44 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Roby].
25. CARNEGIE
REPORT51-53.
26. E.g., 118 CONG.REC.5808-09 (1972) (including remarks of Senator Bayh); Roby
44-50.
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ment efforts.2RThe evidence revealed even greater discrimination
against women faculty? Not only were women hired to teach a t
a disproportionately lower rate than men,30they were also appointed to lower ranks than equally qualified or inferior men
receiving new appointment^.^^ Women faculty were also promoted a t a slower rate32and paid significantly less than their
male counterpart^.^^ In addition, women were "so rarely represented in top academic administrative positions as to be practically nonexistent in the upper echelons."34
27. E.g., CARNEGIE
REPORT44-47; Roby 50-51.
28. E-g., Murray 257-58.
REPORT109-26; Astin & Bayer,
29. See, e.g., 1970 Hearings 196, 312, 645; CARNEGIE
Sex Discrimination in Academe, in ACADEMIC
WOMEN
ON THE MOVE333 (1973); Fidell,
Empirical Verification of Sex Discrimination in Hiring Practices in Psychology, 25 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST
1094 (1970); Morlock, Discipline Variation in the Status of Academic
ON THE MOVE255 (1973); Robinson, Institutional Variation
Women, in ACADEMIC
WOMEN
in the S t a t u s of Academic Women, in ACADEMIC
WOMENON THE MOVE199 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Robinson].
30. See, e.g., Robinson 207 ("The general trend was to employ women at ratios lower
REPORT110-11.
than their proportion of earned degrees in respective fields."); CARNEGIE
The Carnegie Report noted that:
[Dluring the decade of the most explosive growth in the history of higher
education-the 1960's-women lost ground as a percentage of members of regular faculty ranks in four-year institutions, especially a t the associate professor
level . . . .
Id. a t 110. See also 1970 Hearings 645 (statement of Dr. Peter Muirhead, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Associate Commissioner for Higher Education, Office of Education, HEW).
31. A summary of several studies concluded that "the best women stand a chance of
being hired but a t a lesser position than inferior men." Robinson, supra note 29, at 212.
The same survey, however, confessed that "little data" on appointment levels are
available. Id. a t 210.
Studies which used fictitious names and photographs (changed on the basis of sex)
on job application resumes sent to colleges and universities demonstrated that women
were offered lower levels of appointments than men. See, e.g., Fidell, Empirical
Verification of Sex Discrimination in Hiring Practices in Psychology, 25 AM.PSYCHOI.OGIST
1094 (1970).
32. One study that analyzed reports prepared by educational institutions on their
own practices found that "[elvery institutional analysis of promotion that examined
length of time in rank showed that women progressed through the ranks a t a significantly
slower rate than men." Robinson, supra note 29, a t 216 (emphasis omitted).
33. E.g., Morlock, supra note 29, a t 286.
Several studies, by analyzing a multitude of factors such as rank and achievement
characteristics, attempted to determine whether the lower compensation paid women was
attributable to discrimination or a collection of objective factors. After controlling for the
variables, the researchers found an average yearly salary difference of from 31,040 to
REPORT115$2,300 in favor of men. The studies are cited and summarized at CARNEGIE
19; Morlock, supra note 29, at 286-92. The work of one researcher, Elizabeth Scott, is set
forth in detail in CARNEGIE
REPORT
199-235 (appendix C); the results of some work by two
pioneering researchers in the field, Astin and Bayer, are reported in detail in Astin &
Bayer, supra note 29, a t 333-56.
34. CARNEGIE
REPORT123.
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In response to the evidence emerging from its hearings, evidence of discrimination contained in recent studies, the charges
of sex discrimination brought by women's groups, and, no doubt,
the increasing political strength of the women's movement, Congress began action that eventually culminated in passage of title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.

C.

Congressional Action Leading to Enactment of Title IX

In 1971, two aid to higher education bills introduced in the
House of Representatives contained provisions to promote nondiscrimination on the basis of sex in education programs. The
prohibition of discrimination contained in the Nixon administration's bill, H.R. 5191, was criticized as too susceptible of circumvention. The measure prohibited sex-based discrimination by a
"recipient of Federal financial assistance for any education program or activity," but permitted differential treatment "where
sex is a bona fide ground for such differential treatment."35 Representative Edith Green's measure, H.R. 7248, on the other hand,
constituted a more thorough-going attempt to prohibit sex discrimination and was adopted by the House in preference to the
administration's bi11.3W.R. 7248 provided that no person "shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ."37 The measure further proposed to amend title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to eliminate the exemption extended
to educational institutions; to amend the Equal Pay Act of 1963
to extend the protection of that measure to teachers and professors; and to grant to the United States Commission on Civil
-

-

35. H.R. 5191, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 lM)l(a) (1971).
Section 1001(b) of H.R. 5191 proposed to prohibit sex discrimination in employment
by a recipient of federal financial assistance for any education program. It provided:
No recipient of federal financial assistance for an education program or activity
shall, because of an individual's sex-(1) discharge that individual, fail or refuse
to hire (except in instances where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification)
that individual, or otherwise discriminate against him or her with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment; or (2) limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
that individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
or her status an an employee.
Id. 8 1001(b).
36. See 117 CONG.REC. 39248-61 (1971).
37. H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001 (1971), 117 CONC.REC.39098-99 (1971).
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Rights authority to investigate sex d i s c r i m i n a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Portions of the sex discrimination provisions of H.R. 7248
were patterned closely on title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.39
That title prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in any program or activity receiving federal financial a s s i s t a n ~ eIt
. ~further
~
authorizes all federal agenices administering such financial assistance to effectuate the title's prohibition through appropriate regulations and, if the recipient of the
funds fails to comply with the nondiscrimination provisions, to
terminate the federal as~istance.'~
In adopting this scheme, H.R.
7248 incorporated much of the language of title VI.42
The Senate aid to higher education bill, S. 659, originally
contained no reference to sex discrimination. In August 1971,
however, Senator Bayh introduced an amendment to S. 659 gen38. H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. $4 1006-08 (1971), 117 CONG.REC.39099 (1971).
Only the amendment of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 constituted a part of title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972 as finally enacted. Pub. L. No. 92-318, (i 906(b), 86
Stat. 375, amending 29 U.S.C. 4 213(a) (1970) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (Supp. IV,
1974)). See Johnson, supra note 13, a t 574-75 ("Title IX of the Education Amendments
Act of 1972 represents an important extension of the [Equal Pay] Act by establishing
that exemptions to the equal pay provisions of the [Fair Labor Standards Act] no longer
apply to executive, administrative, and professional employees . . . .").
The proposed amendment of title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted in
another bill, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Act of March 24,1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-261, $ 3, 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970) (codified as 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. IV, 1974)).
The provision of H.R. 7248 authorizing the Civil Rights Commission to investigate
the problem of sex discrimination was deleted when the House sustained a point of order
by House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler that the provision came within
595 (1971). The proposal was
the jurisdiction of his committee. See 27 CONG.Q . ALMANAC
eventually passed as part of another measure. Act of Oct. 14, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-496,
# # 3-4, 86 Stat. 813, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1975c(a) (1970) (codified as 42 U.S.C. 4
1975c(a) (Supp. IV, 1974)).
39. 42 U.S.C. $4 2000d to d-6 (1970).
40. Id. $ 2000d.
41. Id. 8 2000d-1.
42. See 117 CONG.REC.39098-99 (1971); Hearing on House Concurrent Resolution .?:I0
(Title IX Regulation) Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975) (testimony of Representative
O'Hara reviewing relationship of title IX to title VI).
Representative Green's bill differed in some details from title VI. For example, title
VI exempts discrimination in employment unless the primary objective of the federal
grant or funding is to provide jobs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1970). H.R. 7248 in its final form
contained no such exemption. (In its initial form, 117 CONG.REC.39098-99 (1971), the bill
contained the exemption because of a clerical error. For a discussion of the error and how
it was remedied see 1975 Hearings on Title ZX Regulation 409 (testimony of Representative O'Hara).) Also, while the former extends to any federally assisted program, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1970), the latter was expressly limited to education programs and activities. See
117 CONC.REC.39098 (1971).
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erally similar to Representative Green's sex discrimination measure yet containing several significant differences." Whereas the
Green bill prohibited discrimination in "any educational program
~ ~ Bayh
or activity receiving Federal financial a s ~ i s t a n c e , "the
amendment prohibited discrimination in "any program or activity conducted by a public institution of higher education, or any
school or department of graduate education, which is a recipient
of Federal financial assistance for any education program or
activity . . . ."45 Also, the Green bill directed all federal agencies
involved in dispensing federal financial assistance to education
;~~
programs to enforce the prohibition of sex d i s c r i m i n a t i ~ n the
Bayh amendment, only HEWa4'
Senator Bayh7s amendment was defeated in August 1971,
when the Senate sustained a ruling by the Chair that the amendment was not germane.48In February 1972, Senator Bayh introduced a somewhat modified version of his original amendment
that tracked almost exactly the language of Representative
Green's House
The modified measure prohibited sex discrimination only in education programs or activities receiving
federal financial assistance and not in all programs conducted by
an institution receiving assistance for any educational program.
Further, the modified amendment directed every involved federal
agency, not just HEW, to enforce the discrimination ban.50The
Senate adopted Senator Bayh7smodified amendment?
On June 8, 1972, Congress adopted a conference version52of
the Green and Bayh antidiscrimination provisions as title IX of
43. 117 CONG.REC.30155-58 (1971).
44. Id. a t 39098.
45. Id. a t 30156.
46. Id. a t 39099.
47. Id. a t 30156.
The Bayh amendment did contain one new proposal, however, which Congress eventually enacted as part of title IX. That proposal constituted an amendment to titles IV
and IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and authorized the Attorney General (1) to initiate
legal proceedings on behalf of individuals suffering sex discrimination in admissions to or
continued attendance a t a public college, and (2) to intervene, on behalf of the United
States, in such litigation already commenced by others. See id. at 30156-57; Education
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 5 906(a), 86 Stat. 375, amending 42 U.S.C. $5
2000c(b), 2000~-6(a)
(2), 2000~-9,2000h-2 (1970).
48. 117 CONG.REC. 30408-15 (1971).
49. 118 CONG.REC.5802-03 (1972).
50. Id. a t 5803.
51. Id. a t 5815.
5'2. The action of the conferees on the sex discrimination provisions is reported at S.
REP. NO. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221-22 (1972).
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the 1972 Education amendment^.^^ President Nixon signed the
measure into law on June 23, 1972.54

A. History of the Title IX Regulation
Soon after title IX was enacted, the Office of Management
and Budget of the executive branch directed HEW to coordinate
the efforts of the several agencies that fund education programs
. ~ ~ was to proin their development of a title IX r e g ~ l a t i o n HEW
vide leadership by drafting a regulation that would be suitable
both for its own use and, with only slight modifications, for adoption and use by the other agencies involved?
In June 1974, two years to the month after passage of the
original legislation, HEW published its proposed title IX regulat i ~ n . It
~ 'immediately generated a heated debate both in Congress
and among the public. Nearly ten thousand formal responses to
the proposed regulation were received during the extraordinary
120-day comment period? Most of the objecting comments criticized the effect of the proposed regulation on intercollegiate ath53. Congressional action leading to enactment of the 1972 Education Amendments
385-98 (1972).
is summarized, as is the legislation itself, a t 28 CONG.Q. ALMANAC
The Education Amendments of 1972 constituted a massive and unprecedented financial aid package to higher education. As finally enacted, the measure authorized $19
billion in aid to postsecondary education. The measure not only expanded the amount of
federal financial assistance available to needy students, it also provided for financial aid
to be paid directly to educational institutions. For example, the act authorized over $450
million in aid to developing institutions and $40 million in aid to schools in serious
financial distress. For a summary of the financial aid provisions of the Education Amendments of 1972 see id.
54. Two HEW attorneys present a summary and analysis of title IX in Buck &
Orleans, Sex Discrimination-A Bar to Democratic Education: Overview of Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 6 CONN.L. REV. 1 (1973). A student-written comment, Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53 TEX. L. REV. 103 (1974), also analyzes title IX and, in
addition, HEW'S proposed title IX regulation.
55. Letter from Robert E. Coy, Assistant General Counsel, Veterans Administration
to Brigham Young University Law Review, October 21, 1975.
56. Id.
57. 39 Fed. Reg. 22227 (1974).
58. When HEW released its final title IX regulation on June 4, 1975, it described the
comment period and the response to the proposed regulation in these terms:
Interested persons were given until October 15, 1974, in which to submit
written comments, suggestions, or objections regarding the proposed regulation.
The Department received over 9700 comments, suggestions or objections . . . .
40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975).
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letics, social fraternities and sororities, and youth service organization~.~~
On June 4, 1975, HEW published its final title IX regulation."That regulation did not become effective immediately,
however. Section 431(d) of the General Education Provisions Act,
as amended by the Education Amendments of 1974, required
HEW to lay before Congress for a period of 45 days its final title
IX regulation." This "laying before" provision was designed to
give Congress an opportunity to review the regulation and, if
found to be "inconsistent with the Act from which it derives its
authority," to disapprove it in a concurrent r e ~ o l u t i o nIf. ~Con~
gress passed such a disapproval resolution, HEW would be required to redraft the offending portions; otherwise, the regulation
would become effective at the end of the 45-day period.63
Soon after the regulation was laid before Congress, members
in both Houses introduced concurrent resolutions condemning
the regulation either in whole or in part." After the introduction
59. In May 1974, Senator Tower, anticipating the regulations' pervasive impact on
athletics, introduced an amendment to the Education Amendments of 1974 exempting
revenue-producing intercollegiate athletics from title IX's prohibition. 120 CONG.REC.
S8488-89 (daily ed. May 20,1974). The amendment, in pertinent part and in its final form,
read:
This section [20 U.S.C. 9 16811 shall not apply to an intercollegiate athletic [activity] to the extent that such activity does or may provide gross
receipts or donations to the institution necessary to support that activity.
Id. a t 238488. The Senate adopted the amendment. Id. a t S8489.
Senator Tower's amendment was deleted and replaced with an exceptionally vague
compromise measure termed "the Javits amendment." That measure required that
HEW'S regulations dealing with intercollegiate athletics consider "the nature of particular
sports." Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612.
Congress acted again in December 1974 by amending title IX to exempt the membership practices of social sororities and fraternities composed primarily of college students,
the YMCA, YWCA, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, and other voluntary youth
service organizations "the membership of which has traditionally been limited to persons
of one sex and principally to persons of less than nineteen years of age." Act of Dec. 31,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1862, amending 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (codified as
20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a)(6) (Supp. 1976)).
60. 40 Fed. Reg. 24127 (1975).
Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of HEW, gives a brief history of the title IX rulemaking process a t 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 437-38.
61. Education Amendments of 1974 § 509(a)(2), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232(d)-(g) (Supp.
1976).
62. 20 U.S.C.A. 4 1232(d) (Supp. 1976).
63. 20 U.S.C.A. 4 1232(d), (e) (Supp. 1976).
The "laying before" provision, its legislative history, and its implications for judicial
review of the title IX regulations are discussed in detail in notes 95-114 and accompanying
text infra.
64. In the Senate, Senator Helms introduced a resolution that constituted a blanket
disapproval of the regulation. S. CON.RES.46,94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG.REC.S9715
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of two resolutions in the Senate," however, that body took no
further action on the matter? In the House, Representative
O'Hara, chairman of the Postsecondary Education Subcommittee, introduced a concurrent resolution disapproving those portions of the regulation (1) requiring educational institutions to
evaluate their own practices, identify areas of sex discrimination,
and take corrective action where necessary; and (2) requiring
schools to establish a grievance procedure to resolve sex discrimination corn plaint^.^^ Following six days of hearings to determine
whether the regulation was "consistent with the law and with the
intent of the Congress in enacting the law,"68the O'Hara subcommittee amended the resolution of its chairman to express disapproval of the requirement that church-sponsored schools petition
HEW for an exemption from provisions of the regulation inconsistent with the school's religious tenets.6gThe subcommittee reported the resolution to the full House Education and Labor
C~mmittee.~~
The full committee, in an action generally viewed as a victory for the lobbying efforts of women's organization^,^' voted by
a narrow margin to refer the matter to its Equal Opportunities
S u b c ~ r n m i t t e eAs
. ~ ~the end of the &day disapproval period approached, that subcommittee held a one-day hearing on the matter,73 then recommended t h a t the full committee reject the
-

-

(daily ed. June 5, 1975); see 121 CONG.REC.59713-15 (daily ed.-~une5, 1975) (remarks of
Senator Helms). Senator Laxalt introduced a resolution disapproving the sections regulating athletic programs. S. CON.RES.52,94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG.REC.S12695 (daily
ed. July 16, 1975); see 121 CONG.REC. S12695-96 (daily ed. July 16, 1975) (remarks of
Senator Laxalt.)
In the House, Representative Martin introduced a broad disapproval resolution, H.R.
CON.RES. 310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 121 CONG.REC.H5636 (daily ed. June 17,
1975), and a more narrow resolution focusing solely on athletics, H.R. CON.RES.311, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Representative O'Hara also introduced a resolution of disapproval
that is discussed a t notes 67-74 and accompanying text infra.
65. See note 64 supra.
66. The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee had jurisdiction over the Helms
and Laxalt concurrent resolutions discussed in note 64 supra. Senator Javits, the ranking
Republican on that committee, told Senator Helms during floor debate on June 6, 1975,
that the committee intended to act on his resolution by mid-July. See 33 CONKQ . 1298
(1975). No evidence could be found, however, that the committee ever took any action on
the matter.
67. H.R. CON.RES. 330, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (introduced July 8, 1975); w e
33 CONG.Q . 1484 (1975).
68. 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 1.
69. 33 CONG.Q . 1484 (1975).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Hearing on H.R. Con. Res. 330 Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of

148

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

O'Hara re~olution.~~
No further congressional action followed. On
July 21, 1975, HEW's title IX regulation became effective.

B. Scope of HEW's Title IX R e g ~ l a t i o n ~ ~
HEW'S title IX regulation is divided into five major subparts
and 43 sections. Only two sections, however, are pertinent to the
analysis of this comment: the definitional section and the section
identifying the general coverage of the regulation.
Central to the ultra vires issue raised by the title IX regulation are the definitions of "federal financial assistance" and "recipient." The first term is defined to include not only grants or
funds extended directly to an institution but also scholarships,
loans, grants, or funds extended directly to students for payment
to the i n ~ t i t u t i o nThus
. ~ ~ the regulation brings such programs as
veterans educational benefits'authorized by the G.I. Bill within
the scope of title IX. The regulation defines "recipient" as any
entity (1)that receives federal financial assistance from the government or another recipient and (2) that "operates an education
program or activity which receives or benefits from such assist a n ~ e . "This
~ ~ definition is crucial since section 86.11, describing
coverage, states that the title IX regulation "applies to every
recipient and to each education program or activity operated by
such recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial
assistance ."78
Although it is nowhere explicit in the regulation, HEW takes
the position that all education programs and activities of a "recipient" benefit from federal financial assistance. In other words,
if any single education program of an institution receives federal
assistance, all of the programs and activities of the institution,
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
74. 33 CONG.Q. 1563 (1975).
75. The discussion in this section is necessarily cursory; emphasis is placed only on
those provisions treated in Part III of this comment. A more detailed discussion of the
scope of the regulation appears in a HEW Fact Sheet released simultaneously with the
final regulation and reprinted a t OFFICEFOR CNILRIGHTS,HEW, FINALTITLEIX REGULATION IMPLEMENTING
EDUCATION
AMENDMENTS
OF 1972 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HEW
FACTSHEET].
The scope of HEW's proposed title IX regulation is discussed in some detail in
DUNKLE
& SANDLER,
SEXDISCRIMINATION
AGAINST
STUDENTS:
IMPLICATIONS
OF TITLEIX OF
THE EDUCATION
AMENDMENTS
OF 1972 (reprinted in 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation
354-77). For a detailed but disapproving examination of the final regulation see 1975
Hearings on Title IX Regulation 449-521 (memorandum submitted by Senator Helms).
76. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(g) (1975).
77. Id. § 86.2(h).
78. Id. § 86.11 (emphasis added).
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not just the single program receiving the aid, are subject to the
HEW stated this view in a memorandum
regulatory s~herne.'~
released simultaneously with the final regulation:
79. Both proponents and opponents of the regulation have recognized that HEW's
approach is institutional rather than programmatic, that is, that if any one program
receives or benefits from federal financial assistance, the entire institon is subjected to
regulation. For example, NOW, a supporter of the regulation, made the following comment on the proposed regulation:
We have received reports from women around the country that some school
administrators insist that the only activities covered are specific activities directly receiving federal aid (the school lunch program, for example, or a Title I
ESEA tutoring project). This is a crucial point, since many areas of serious
discrimination do not directly receive federal aid (athletics, shop, home economics, most curriculum materials, and so on).
On the other hand, HEW staff tell us that an "education program or activity" benefitting from federal financial assistance is almost anything that goes
on in an institution of education. The regulation implies this interpretation, by
covering athletics, dorm curfews, and the like, but it nowhere states it.
121 CONG.REC. S772 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1975).
A university president testifying on the final regulation observed:
The Regulations seem to provide that if an educational institution has received,
even indirectly, a single dollar of federal money, every decision, activity, facility,
educational policy or communication of that institution is subject to review and
regulation by the Department.
Sections 86.2 (g) and (h) of the Regulations provide that an institution is a
"recipient', of "federal financial assistance" even if its receipt of federal assistance is only indirect or minimal. For example, they would apparently make an
institution subject to control if it enrolled only one student receiving veteran's
benefits or attending school under a federal grant or loan. In addition, the
underlying premise of the Regulations-evident throughout-is that being a
"recipient" subjects every institutional program or activity to regulation
whether or not that particular program or activity received federal financial
assistance. The Department has therefore taken the position that if a college or
university receives some direct or indirect financial assistance for its department
of chemistry it must accept government supervision of all of its other academic
departments, its dormitories, its admissions and financial aids policies, and
every other aspect of its operations.
1975 Hearings on Title ZX Regulation 232-33 (prepared statement of Dr. Dallin H. Oaks,
president, Brigham Young University, and director and secretary of the American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities).
A memorandum prepared by the American Law Division of the Library of Congress
for Senator Bayh interpreted the scope of the proposed regulation in a slightly different
way:
In short, the proposed regulations arguably reflect a position on the part of the
agency [HEW] that, for purposes of determining compliance, the educational
activities of institutional recipients may, where general admissions policies are
concerned, be viewed as a [sic] individual entity. Where less pervasive forms
of discrimination are involved, however, the regulations seem to contemplate a
program by program approach to coverage.
1975 Hearings on Title ZX Regulation 188. This latter interpretation seems to be foreclosed, however, by HEW's own statements. See note 80 and accompanying text infra.
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Except for the specific limited exemptions set forth below,
the final regulation applies to all aspects of all education programs or activities of a school district, institution of higher education, or other entity which receives Federal funds for any of
those programs.sn

HEW apparently bases its position on what may be termed the
"benefit" theory: Federal financial assistance to one program
benefits all of the institution's other programs since that
assistance "releases" institutional funds for use in the other program~.~'

A.

Ultra Vires Challenges to Administrative Regulations: In
General

Ultra vires, a term normally used only in the law of corporations," is employed in this comment as a shorthand reference to
acts beyond the lawful power of an administrative agency or department. Thus, when an agency promulgates rules or regulations
that extend or modify the authorizing statute, the act is ultra
vires and, under well-established doctrine, invalid." The Supreme Court has stated the principle in these terms:
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a
federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end
is not the power to make law . . . but the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the
statute. A regulation which does not do this, but operates to
create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.84
80. HEW FACTSHEET,supra note 75, a t 3 (emphasis added). HEW's Secretary Weinberger repeated this language when testifying on the title IX regulation before Representative O'Hara's subcommittee:
The regulation, briefly, provides as follows: Except for certain limited exemptions, the final regulation applies to all aspects of all educational programs
or activities of a school district, institution of higher education, or other entity
which receives Federal funds for any of those programs.
1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 438.
81. The "benefit" theory has often been advanced by proponents of a broad interpretation of the regulation. See, e.g., 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 171 (prepared
statement of Senator Bayh); id. a t 387 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandler); Comment,
Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public
Schools, 53 TEX.L. REV.103, 110 (1974).
LAWDICTIONARY
1692 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
82. See BLACK'S
83. See, e.g., Campbell v. Galeno Chem. Co., 281 U S . 599, 610 (1930); Federal
Maritime Comm'n v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1964).
84. Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965), quoting Manhattan General
Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
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The process for resolving an ultra vires challenge to an administrative regulation is deceptively simple to outline. The reviewing court first construes the underlying statute and identifies
its scope, then repeats this process with the regulation. The scope
of both statute and regulation are then compared, and aspects of
the regulation that extend the scope of the statute, if any, are
declared invalid. In practice, however, proper resolution of such
challenges can be exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless, unlike the
delegation doctrine in administrative law, to which only lip service has been paid for the last thirty yearQ5 the ultra vires principle is not infrequently applied to invalidate administrative regulation~.~~
As noted, courts in resolving an ultra vires challenge must
construe the authorizing statute. Yet an administrative regulation itself often serves as an interpretation of the underlying statute. Because of the expertise generally ascribed to the promulgating agency or department, and perhaps for other more sensitive
but often unarticulated reasons,s7 courts generally give some degree of deference to the interpretation embodied in the regulat i ~ n . ~ V hdegree
e
of deference afforded, however, extends from
great, or even excessive, to minimal. At the one extreme, courts
state that they will sustain a regulation unless it is "plainly and
palpably inconsistent with the governing statute."@ At the other
85. See W. GELLHORN
& C. BYSE,ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW84 (6th ed. 1974).
A delegation challenge to the title IX regulation may not be completely futile; certainly it would not be frivolous. See generally Wright, Book Review, 81 YALEL.J. 575,58287 (1972). A possible delegation challenge t o title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is
examined and rejected in Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the
South, 53 VA. L. REV.42, 49-53 (1967).
86. See, e.g., FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U S . 284 (1954); Campbell v.
Galeno Chem. Co., 281 U S . 599 (1930); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C.
Cir. 1975),petition for cert. filed sub. norn. Virginia v. Train, 44 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Jan.
26, 1976) (No. 75-1050); Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR.REP. DEC. 1105 (4th Cir., Sept. 19,
1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3417 ( U S . Jan. 7, 1976) (75-960); Brown v.
EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3381 ( U S . Dec. 24,1975)
(No. 75-909); Vialpando v. Shea, 475 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 416 U S . 251 (1974);
Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964);
United States v. Silva, 272 F. Supp. 46 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
87. A federal court, for example, may hesitate to invalidate the actions of a coequal
branch of the government, such as the executive branch acting through one of its departments or agencies. Or a court may defer to an administrative interpretation out of a
disinclination to undertake the almost always difficult task of statutory construction.
88. For an excellent summary of the aspect of judicial deference discussed here see
1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 187, 190-91 (memorandum from the American Law
Division of the Library of Congress to Senator Bayh).
89. E.g., Mt. Vernon Cooperative Bank v. Gleason, 250 F. Supp. 952, 954 (D. Mass.
1966). See also Jno. McCall Coal Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 689,691-92 (4th Cir. 1967).
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extreme, courts state that "an inquiry to determine if the agency
has exceeded its statutory power is a constitutional obligation"
of the courts, discharge of which "is an exercise of judicial authority to preserve the legislative scheme."90 Under the latter view,
little, if any, deference is afforded the agency's interpretationY

B.

Ultra Vires Challenges to the Title IX Regulation

This comment analyzes the two major ultra vires challenges
that have been leveled a t HEW's title IX regulation: (1) By defining "federal financial assistance" to include not only federal aid
paid directly to an educational institution but also federal aid
paid directly to students who in turn use it to meet education
expenses at the school of their choice, the regulation goes beyond
the scope of the statute. (2) By subjecting all programs of an
institution to HEW regulation if any one program receives or
benefits from federal financial assistance, the regulation improperly extends the authorizing statute. If these two challenges are
sustained, the regulation would need to be extensively modified
and the quantum of federal agency intervention in many schools
and universities would be significantly reduced.92
In analyzing these two major ultra vires challenges, the crucial inquiry goes to the scope of the authorizing statute, title IX.
This comment uses standard tools of statutory construction in
measuring the scope of that statute: (1) the language of the statute itself; (2) the interpretation given similar or analogous statutes, in this case title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and (3) the
legislative history of the statute, including congressional debate
on the measure before its enactment. Before analyzing the scope
of the statute, however, one unusual feature of title IX bearing
on the ultra vires issues requires consideration. The title IX regulation was laid before Congress pursuant to section 431(d) of the
General Education Provisions Act, as amended by the 1974 Edu90. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Benj. Harris & Co., 245 F. Supp. 467, 472 (N.D.
Ill. 1965). See also Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1074 (5th Cir.
1969).
91. See, e.g., Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969);
Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964);
United States v. Silva, 272 F. Supp. 46 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
92. There is a third possible ultra vires challenge of major proportions that alleges
that title IX grants HEW no authority over employment practices. If such a challenge
were upheld, it would completely eliminate subpart E of HEW's regulation. This challenge is presented a t 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 406-08 (testimony of Janet
Kuhn); id. at 521 (memorandum submitted by Senator Helms).
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cation Amendments.03 Congress, or at least some parts of it, reviewed the regulation to determine whether it "is inconsistent
with the Act from which it derives its authority . . . ."94 That
fact, coupled with the fact that Congress did not signal with a
concurrent resolution of disapproval a finding of inconsistency,
may have a significant impact on judicial review of any ultra vires
challenges to the regulation.
I.

The "laying before" procedure

From 1939 to the present, various statutes have contained a
"laying before" provision, usually designed to make "administrative exercise of delegated power subject to congressional approval
or disapproval by concurrent resolution or simple r e s o l ~ t i o n . " ~ ~
Congress stated the purpose of the statute requiring HEW to lay
its title IX regulation before Congress, section 431(d) of the General Education Provisions Act as amended in 1974,96in these
terms:
The problem which this amendment seeks to meet is the
steady escalation of agency quasi-legislative power, and the corresponding attrition in the ability of the Congress to make the
law. For at least four decades now, the agencies of the Executive
93. See note 61-74 and accompanying text supra.
94. General Education Provisions Act § 431(d), 20 U.S.C.A. 8 1232(d) (Supp. 1976).
95. Cotter & Smith, Administrative Accountability to Congress: The Concurrent
Resolution, 9 WESTERN
POL.Q. 955, 959 (1956).
For a general history of the "laying before" procedure in the United States see J.
HARRIS,CONGRESSIONAL
CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATION
204-38 (1964).
The British "laying before" procedure is discussed in detail a t Boisvert, A Legislative
L. REV.
Tool for Supervision of Administrative Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM
638, 639-50 (1957).
Various constitutional attacks have been leveled a t the "laying before" procedure.
Commentators opposing the "laying before" procedure on constitutional grounds include
HARRIS,
supra, a t 238-44; Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV.L. REV.569, 586-87 (1953); Comment,
Congress Steps Out: A Look a t Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF.L. REV.
983, 1065-81 (1975). Commentators arguing for the constitutionality of the procedure
include Boisvert, supra, a t 65x-61; Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules
and Regulations: The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031, 1042 (1955) (All
authorities who claim that the "laying before" procedure is unconstitutional, "eminent
though they may be, are clearly wrong both in their approach to the question of constitutionality and their answer to it.").
No American court has yet resolved the constitutional issues. Justice White in a
concurring opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 44 U.S.L.W. 4127, 4212-13 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1976),
however, argued that the "laying before" procedure could withstand the most prominent
constitutional attack leveled a t it: namely, that the procedure improperly infringes on the
President's veto power.
96. 20 U.S.C.A. 8 1232(d) (Supp. 1976).
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Branch have increasingly used their rule-making authority to
"correct" what they feel are the errors and ambiguities of the
law. And for that same four decades, the Congress has, increasingly, given to those agencies, broader and broader areas of discretionary rule-making .

....

The Executive Branch, under administrations of both parties, has eagerly seized authority which Congress, under the
control of either party, has all too carelessly allowed to slip from
its hands.%'

An early advocate of the "laying before" procedure, Professor
Boisvert, identified the possibility that the "laying before" procedure may operate to narrow the scope of judicial review of regulations subjected to ultra vires attacks:
Legislative participation in rulemaking would be a persuasive indication to reviewing courts of legislative approval of any
regulation placed before its scrutinizing committee. . . . Such
legislative participation in agency rulemaking would . . . eliminate in part the possibility of future voiding of the regulation by
the courts on an ultra vires basis, since such laying could be
interpreted as congressional approval of the agency r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~

Professor Boisvert may have overstated the impact of the "laying
before" procedure on judicial review in his eagerness to promote
the device, but the central idea of his assertions appears to be
sound and is supported by some judicial authority? Indeed, a
97. H.R.REP.NO. 93-805, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1974) (accompanying H.R.69).
98. Boisvert, supra note 95, at 665 (footnotes omitted).
99. When an ultra vires attack on the then new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
brought before the United States Supreme Court in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1
(1941), the Court found that the Rules did not go beyond the scope of the statute authorizing the Court to promulgate such rules. In support of this holding, the Court argued, inter
alia:
Moreoever, in accordance with the [Enabling] Act, the rules were submitted
to the Congress so that that body might examine them and veto their going into
effect if contrary to the policy of the legislature [embodied in the Enabling
Act.]
The value of the reservation of the power to examine proposed rules, laws
and regulations before they become effective is well understood by Congress. It
is frequently, as here, employed to make sure that the action under the delegation squares with the Congressional purpose. Evidently the Congress felt the
rule was within the ambit of the statute as no effort was made to eliminate it
from the proposed body of rules, although this specific rule was attacked and
defended before the committees of the two Houses. . . . That no adverse action
was taken by Congress indicates, at least, that no transgression of legislative
policy was found. We conclude that the rules under attack are within the authority granted.
Id. a t 14-16 (footnotes omitted).
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student commentator reached a similar, though more thoughtful,
conclusion concerning the impact of the "laying before" procedure on judicial review.
The scope of judicial review will probably be narrowed by
the existence of the laying procedure. . . . [Tlhe effect of congressional approval would seem . . . to be that of establishing
a strong presumption that the rule was within the authority of
the agency, but with an opportunity to establish the contrary.
Unless congressional consideration became perfunctory, the effect of assent should be of considerably greater weight than that
accorded such supposed expressions of congressional intent as
renewing without comment the statute on which a regulation is
based. Ion

This comment identifies two crucial concepts: (1) Congressional review does not preclude judicial review, and (2) the nature, or quality, of the congressional review should have a bearing
on the extent and rigor of subsequent judicial review. The first
concept appears almost self-evident and needs little elaboration.
Congressionnal failure to disapprove a regulation laid before it
cannot protect the regulation from an ultra vires attack; congressional inaction cannot operate to make a regulation an Act of
Congress. The regulation remains merely the product of delegated rulemaking power exercised by an administrative department; as such, the possibility exists that it exceeds the scope of
the Act that was passed by Congress and is therefore vulnerable
to judicial review on ultra vires grounds.lolThe second concept is
more complex than the first, however, and merits elaboration in
the context of the title IX regulation.
Certain features of the congressional review of the title IX
regulation may persuade a court to limit its review of the regulation. First, a great deal of publicity and public interest surrounded the laying of the regulation before Congress. Congress
was not unaware of its opportunity to review the regulation or of
its power to disapprove it by concurrent resolution. This fact is
demonstrated by the action of several senators and representatives in introducing various concurrent resolutions of disap100. Note, "Laying on the Table9'-A Device for Legislative Control Over Delegated
Powers, 65 HARV.
L. REV.637, 647 (1952) (footnotes omitted).
101. A British court has held that Parliamentary approval of an administrative regulation did not protect the regulation from ultra vires challenges in the courts, since the
approval did not make the regulation an Act of Parliament. Rex v. Electricity Comm'rs,
119241 1 K.B. 171.
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proval.lo2Further, one subcommittee conducted rather extensive
hearings on the matter and considered therein some of the same
ultra vires arguments t h a t may eventually be made to the
courts.lo3In sum, to use the words of the student commentator
quoted above, the "congressional consideration" was not "perfunctory."lo4
Other features of the congressional review, however, strongly
suggest that the courts should be cautious not to accord undue
weight to that review. First, no member of the Senate and only
few members of the House considered and voted on the merits of
any of the several concurrent resolutions of disapproval intro' ~ ~ limited review was the result, a t least
duced in C o n g r e s ~ .This
in part, of the procedural maneuverings of congressional supporters of the regulation designed to delay and thereby prevent review
on the merits during the relatively short 45-day review period.'""
Also in this context, it should be noted that of the two House
subcommittees that did vote on a resolution of disapproval, the
subcommittee that conducted the most thorough and extensive
hearings on the matter, Representative O'Hara's Subcommittee
on Postsecondary Education, voted to disapprove portions of the
regulation.lo7
Second, the regulation came before Congress three years
after Congress enacted the original title IX legislation.'" The
Ninety-second Congress enacted title IX; the Ninety-fourth Congress reviewed the title IX regulation. Undoubtedly there was a
substantial continuity of membership between the enacting and
the reviewing Congress. Nevertheless, many congressmen confronted with the task of reviewing the regulation had no part in
the enactment of the authorizing statute and thus had no more
direct access to the intent of Congress in passing title IX than a
reviewing court will have when considering the same matter.Io9
102. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
103. See 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has already initiated a suit
against HEW, challenging the validity of the title IX regulation. The complaint makes
the same two ultra vires challenges examined in this comment. NCAA v. Mathews, Civil
No. 76-32-C2 (D. Kan., filed Feb. 17, 1976).
104. Note, supra note 100, a t 647.
105. See notes 62-74 and accompanying text supra.
106. See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra.
107. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra.
108. See notes 54, 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
109. For example, 13 of the 40 members of the House Committee on Education and
Labor of the Ninety-fourth Congress were not members of the Ninety-second Congress.
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Also, the three-year delay may have dulled somewhat the recollection of congressmen engaged in both the enactment of title IX
and the review of the regulation.ll0
Third, the limited review of the regulation that did occur was
not a dispassionate, detached congressional attempt at legal
analysis. Congressional review of the regulation was heavily influenced by political forces. Lobbyists representing feminist interests brought substantial pressure to bear ,on congressmen involved in the review.11'Congressional consideration of the regulation resembled in many ways the activity that surrounds legislative action on a proposed statute.*12A reviewing court, therefore,
should not take a t face value Representative O'Hara's statement
opening the 1975 hearings that HEW's title IX "regulations will
be reviewed [by Congress] solely to see if they are consistent
with the law and with the intent of Congress in enacting the
law."Il3 Reviewing congressmen were a t least as concerned with
measuring the political ramifications of their approval or disapproval of the regulation as they were with measuring the regulation against the intended scope of title IX.
In light of the various features of Congress's review of the
title IX regulation outlined above, a self-imposed limitation, of
any significant degree, on the scope of judicial review of the regulation appears inappropriate.l14
Compare 28 CONG.Q . ALMANAC24-25 (1972) (membership roll of the Ninety-second Congress) with 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation ii (membership roll of the House Committee on Education and Labor of the Ninety-fourth Congress).
110. For example, when Senator Bayh was debating in support of title IX on the floor
of the Senate, he was asked what types of federal aid might be cut off if a violation
occurred. He responded that "specific assistance that was being received by individual
students" would not be cut off. 117 CONG.REC.30408 (1971). During the 1975 hearings on
the regulation, Representative Quie queried Bayh on this statement in light of HEW's
action in bringing direct student assistance within the scope of the term federal financial
assistance. See 45 C.F.R. 6 86.2(g) (1975). Specifically, Quie wanted t o know whether
HEW had "overstepped its bounds in claiming that an institution is conducting a program
or activity financed by the Federal Government if a student is receiving Federal aid to
attend that program or those programs." Bayh responded: "You know, I just don't know.
I would have to look that up if you would like . . . ." 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation
181-82.
111. See, e.g., 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 216 (statement of Lillian
Hatcher, United Auto Workers (UAW) Women's Dept.) ("A vote against these regulations
is a vote against the workers the UAW represents.").
112. The lobbying efforts of feminist groups in support of the regulation have already
been mentioned. Strong opposition to the regulation came from, among others, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and various college football coaches. See,
e.g., id. at 46 (Darrel Royal, president, American Football Coaches Ass'n); id. a t 98 (John
A. Fuzak, president, NCAA).
113. Id. at 1.
114. If perspective is yet possible on congressional action reviewing HEW'S title IX
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T h e definition of ((receivi2gfederal financial assistance"

Title IX prohibits, with certain exceptions, sex discrimination in any education program or activity "receiving Federal financial assistance."115HEW's title IX regulation defines "federal
financial assistance" to include not only funds paid directly to an
education institution but also "[s]cholarships, loans, grants,
wages or other funds extended to any entity for payment to or on
behalf of students admitted to that entity, or extended directly
to such students for payment to that entity."llThe question
arises whether HEW's definition, particularly the provision covering direct student aid, exceeds the intended scope of the authorizing statute and is thus ultra vires.
a. T h e language of the statute. The language of title IX
suggests two conditions for application of the statute's prohibition: (1) an institution must "receive" (2) whatever constitutes
"federal financial assistance." Focusing for the moment solely on
the first condition, it seems doubtful that an educational institution "receives" federal money paid to a student, such as veterans'
educational benefits."' HEW apparently perceived this difficulty
with its definition; in a subsequent definition, that of "recipient,"
regulation, it indicates the validity of the following evaluation of the "laying before"
procedure in general, made 20 years ago by two commentators on the procedure:
Experience with the concurrent resolution indicates that Congress is more
imaginative in fashioning tools for checking and influencing the administration
of delegated powers than it is skillful and determined in employing them to hold
administrators to clearly defined standards of performance.
Cotter & Smith, supra note 95, a t 966.
115. 20 U.S.C. 5 1681(a) (Supp. IV, 1974); note 1 supra.
116. 45 C.F.R. 5 86.2(g)(l)(ii)(1975).
117. One commentator on this issue stated:
Since the language of Title IX speaks in terms of "receiving Federal financial assistance," it is useful to consider the meaning of the term "receiving."
Realizing that this term has historically been employed in the drafting of legislation, in addition to its wide use throughout the law, the commentator believes
that recourse to a more legalistic definition is appropriate (although application
of the common, customary definition as contained in Webster would render the
same result). Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 74, "Receive," page 643, provides
that ". . . 'receiving' necessarily implies consenting to receive, and that there
is a receiving whenever there is a change of possession, as when one parts with
the control of a thing and another takes and accepts it." Clearly, the act of
"receiving" occurs and is completed when one entity delivers possession of a
thing to another entity, which accepts it. There is no basis for believing that
Congress intended by the enactment of Title IX that the meaning of this term
should be extended so as to indirectly encompass remote benefits to some program or activity separate from the education program or activity to which the
Federal financial assistance is given.
1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 508 (memorandum submitted by Senator Helms).
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HEW provided that the regulation applies to an entity "which
operates an education program or activity which receives or
benefits from [federal financial] assistance . . . ."l18 A persuasive argument can be made that a school indeed benefits when
it qualifies to enroll students receiving, for example, veterans'
educational benefits or federally guaranteed loans.lIg HEW'S use
of the term benefits, however, is too facile a solution to its problem. Title IX, by its own language, extends only to programs that
"receive" federal financial assistance. By superadding the
broader, more inclusive term benefits to the language of the statute, thus permitting inclusion of direct federal aid to students in
the definition of federal financial assistance, HEW undoubtedly
extended the scope of the statute and, unless the Department has
access to other saving arguments, rendered its regulation vulnerable to ultra vires challenges.120
b. The legislative history. The legislative history bearing on
the scope and definition of "federal financial assistance" in title
IX consists of only one statement by the sponsor of the Senate
version of the measure, Senator Bayh. During debate on the measure, Senator Dominick asked what type of federal aid could be
terminated for a violation of title IX.121This question can be read
as going to the scope of the term federal financial assistance since
the "assistance" federal departments or agencies may terminate,
under the authority of title IX's second section, is obviously the
same assistance termed "federal financial assistance" throughout
other portions of the statute.ln Senator Bayh responded initially
that "all aid that comes through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare" could be terminated. 123 He then qualified his
answer, however, with these words: "It is unquestionable, in my
judgment, that this [termination] would not be directed a t specific assistance that was being received by individual students,
118. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (1975) (emphasis added).
119. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 601-04 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd
mem., No. 72-2164 (4th Cir., May 28, 1975); notes 129-133and accompanying text infra.
120. For a more detailed discussion of the issues treated in this subsection see 1975
Hearings on Title IX Regulation 499,507-08 (memorandum submitted by Senator Helms).
121. 117 CONG.REC.30408 (1971).
122. See notes 1-2 supra. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. IVY1974), the section of title IX
providing for federal administrative enforcement, uses the full term Federal financial
assistance initially; twice thereafter in the section, the shorthand term assistance is used.
123. 117 CONG.REC.30408 (1971).
At the time of his response, Senator Bayh's bill directed only HEW and not all federal
departments and agencies to effectuate the sex discrimination prohibition through regulations and, if necessary, fund termination. See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
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but would be directed a t the institution . . . ."124
On its face, the Senator's response supports the conclusion
that direct aid to students was intended to be left outside the
scope of the term federal financial assistance. Supporters of the
regulation, however, may argue that Senator Bayh's comment is
not inconsistent with the regulation's inclusion of direct student
aid within the definition of that term. The regulation provides
that when a school violates title IX it may be denied the right to
enroll students receiving federal aid, such as veterans' educational benefits. But since the individual student's right to receive
those benefits continues if he or she matriculates at a qualifying
school, the termination is not "directed a t specific assistance that
was being received by individual students." Only if the student
elects-for personal, professional, educational, or religious reasons-to commence or continue at a school not in compliance
with the regulation will his or her federal assistance be terminated. 125
This last argument-that termination would be the result of
a personal decision and not the result of HEW'S title IX regulation-is at best only partially satisfactory. If a federal agency or
-

-

124. Id. The pertinent portion of the dialogue reads:
Mr. Dominick. What type of aid the recipient might be getting would be
cut off? Let us suppose, for example, that they have guaranteed loans for construction. Let us suppose that they have research grants under the NIH. Let us
suppose that they are doing graduate work in some programs authorized by the
Defense Department. Just what type of aid are we cutting off here?
Mr. Bayh. We are cutting off all aid that comes through the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, and as to the specific ones, the Senator has
mentioned, I think they would all be included with the exception of research
grants made through other departments such as the Department of Defense.
Mr. Dominick. The Senator is talking about every program under HEW?
Mr. Bayh. Let me suggest that I would imagine t h a t any person who was
sitting at the head of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, administering this program, would be reasonable and would use only such leverage
as was necessary against the institution.
It is unquestionable, in my judgment, that this would not be directed a t
specific assistance that was being received by individual students, but would be
directed at the institution, and the Secretary would be expected to use good
judgment as to how much leverage to apply, and where i t could best be applied.
125. Seegenerally Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd
mem., No. 74-2164 (4th Cir., May 28, 1975); notes 129-133 and accompanying text infra.
In the Bob Jones case, the court upheld administrative action terminating, under title VI,
the right of eligible veterans seeking an education a t the university to receive veterans'
educational benefits. It was clear from the decision that an otherwise eligible veteran
could requalify for benefits by matriculating a t an eligible school. Also, the order of
termination was prospective only; already enrolled veterans could continue receiving benefits until completion of their studies.
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department terminated direct student aid following a student's
decision to matriculate at a noncomplying school, the legal basis
for the action would be title IX, as construed by the regulation.
Title IX, in other words, would be employed to terminate "specific assistance that was being received by individual students,"
contrary to the assurance of Senator Bayh that the statute would
not be used in that manner.126
In conclusion, the legislative history bearing on the definition
of federal financial assistance indicates that Congress intended
that no direct federal aid to individual students be terminated
solely by operation of title IX. The legislative history is less conclusive when such termination results from both title IX sanctions directed at an institution and the personal decision of a
federally assisted student to continue or commence his or her
education a t a noncomplying school. On its face, Senator Bayh's
assurance permits not even contingent termination-that is, termination in the latter situation-of funds under title IX. If the
statement is thus read, it indicates a congressional intent as
broad as that defined above: Title IX is not to be used, directly
or indirectly, to terminate federal aid to individual students. The
regulation's inclusion of direct aid to students within the definition of federal financial assistance may, indeed is likely to, operate in contravention of that intent .I2'
c. T h e interpretation of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Administrative regulations and federal court decisions
cannot
construing and applying title VI of the Civil Rights
be applied automatically in the title IX context, for reasons discussed below. Nevertheless, because of the similarity between
title VI and title IX, regulations and court decisions construing
the former must necessarily be persuasive and influential author126. See note 124 supra.
127. Senator Bayh, in a letter to Senator Pel1 answering questions raised by a university president that was made a part of the record prior to enactment of title IX, stated
that "the provisions of my amendment in question are parallel to those found in [title VI
of the] 1964 Civil Rights Act. Since 1964, there has been ample opportunity to establish
enforcement procedure with respect to discrimination on the basis of race; enforcement
of my amendment will draw heavily on these precedents." 118 CONG.REC.18437 (1972).
Proponents of the regulation may argue that this and similar statements reveal a
congressional intent to construe title IX as broadly as title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
It should be remembered, however, that at the time of enactment of title IX, title VI had
not been applied to terminate federal aid paid directly to students. That broader application only came later. See notes 129-133 and accompanying text infra. Indeed, as late as
the 1975 hearings on HEW'S title IX regulation, Senator Bayh appears to have been
unaware of such an application of title VI. See note 110 supra.
128. 42 U.S.C. $ 9 200Od to d-6 (1970).
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ity in the construction of the latter. Indeed, the strongest support
for HEW's broad definition of "receiving federal financial assistance" comes from title VI regulations and cases.
The most important title VI case supporting HEW's position
is Bob Jones University v. Johnson.12gIn that case, an administrative law judge of HEW, following an evidentiary hearing, issued
an order terminating the right of eligible veterans to receive veterans' educational benefits while enrolled a t Bob Jones University.
The judge based the order on the university's refusal to admit
unmarried blacks and otherwise to comply with the VA's
regulation implementing title VI.130 The VA approved and enforced the order.131
The university and an eligible veteran desiring to attend the
university sought injunctive relief in federal district court to
block the VA's action. The plaintiffs alleged, among other things,
that the university did not receive federal financial assistance, as
that term is used in title VI, and was therefore not subject to
either title VI's prohibition or its ~ a n c t i 0 n s .The
l ~ ~ federal district
court dismissed the complaint, holding that the university received federal financial assistance within the scope of title VI
when it enrolled students receiving veterans' educational benefits. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
per curiam. 133
The holding of the district court is obviously based on a
broad construction of "receiving federal financial assistance," one
that includes federal aid paid directly to students. That construction is based in turn on the view that "all that is necessary for
Title VI purposes is a showing that the infusion of federal money
through payments to veterans assists the education program of
the approved school."134In the Bob Jones case, the court found
the requisite assistance or benefit in two facts: (1) But for the
federal payment of veterans' benefits to qualifying students, the
university would spend its own funds-through scholarships,
129. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., No. 74-2164 (4th Cir., May 28,1975).
130. Specifically, the university refused to sign an assurance of compliance with title
VI required by the VA's title VI regulation, 38 C.F.R. 8 18.4 (1975), as a condition of
federal assistance. 396 F. Supp. at 599.
131. The order was prospective only. Already enrolled veterans were permitted to
continue receiving veterans' educational benefits during the duration of their studies. 396
F. Supp. at 599.
132. Id. at 601-02.
133. No. 74-2164 (4th Cir., May 28, 1975).
134. 396 F. Supp. at 603 n.22 (emphasis added).
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grants, and loans-to assist those students.13"2) But for the
availability of the federal funds, many veterans would not enroll
a t the university. Thus, the availability of the funds "benefits the
school by enlarging the pool of qualified applicants upon which
it can draw for its education program."136
Obviously, these two "benefits" identified by the court are
attenuated. As a practical matter, however, federal assistance,
and hence federal involvement, may range from direct and substantial to minimal and highly attenuated. Thus the courts are
confronted with a difficult task of line drawing: At what point
does the federally-conferred "benefit" become so attentuated
that it no longer constitutes "federal financial assistance" within
the meaning of title VI? Some courts have taken the position that
such indirect benefits as those flowing from tax deductions and
exemptions fall within the scope of title VI,13' or constitute "state
action" for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment purposes.138But no
clear and definitive guidelines for resolution of the line-drawing
issue have yet been articulated. Hence, the possibility exists that
the attenuated, indirect "benefits" identified by the court in Bob
Jones will not qualify as "federal financial assistance" or "state
action" under standards yet to be devised.
Assuming, however, that the court in Bob Jones correctly
resolved the line-drawing issue, the question remains whether the
underpinnings of that case's broad construction of title VI are
applicable to title IX. Three identifiable underpinnings emerge
from the court's opinion. First, it would be incongruous to draw
a distinction between payments received directly by the university and payments received by the veteran since the beneficial
effect of the university is the same under either method of transmittal. "[Tlhe payments ultimately reach the same beneficiaries and the benefit to a university would be the same in either
event." 139 Second, the language and legislative history of title VI
135. Id. at 602-03.
136. Id. at 603.
The court apparently failed to recognize that this second "benefit," while arguably
"federal" and "assistance," is not essentially "financial." The benefit is educational in a
qualitative sense.
137. E . g . , McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge
court).
138. E.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1151 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd
mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). It is as yet unclear whether a finding
of "federal financial assistance" for title VI purposes and a finding of "state action" for
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment purposes are based on the same standard.
139. 396 F. Supp. at 603.
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revealed no congressional intent to exempt veterans' benefits
from the scope of the statute.lq0Finally, since federal participation in or support of even private racially discriminatory conduct
~ ~ court adopted a broad construction of
is u n c ~ n s t i t u t i o n a l ,the
title VI, including the phrase "receiving federal financial assistance," to avoid raising questions concerning the constitutionality of the grant statutes.lq2
The first underpinning cannot bear close scrutiny in either
the title VI or the title IX context. It is true that if tuition payments constitute a benefit, there may be little practical significance to the identity of the immediate recipient, whether the
university or the veteran who in turn pays the funds to the university to meet tuition costs. But under the analysis of the Bob Jones
court itself, the actual payment of tuition fees does not constitute
the requisite benefit. Rather, all the "benefits" identified by the
court flow from the fact that the school qualifies to enroll federally assisted veterans.lq3 The payment of tuition fees must be
viewed as merely a quid pro quo transaction. This is demonstrated by the approach taken in HEW'S title IX regulation where
exchanges between a university and the federal government for
fair market value are expressly left outside the scope of "federal
financial assistance."Iq4
Strong arguments also appear that when the second and
third underpinnings are transferred from the context of title VI
140. Id. at 604 ("Nothing in the congressional debate on what became the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 compels exclusion of these [veterans' benefits] statutes from Title VI
coverage.").
141. The court stated:
Another dimension as to the federal government's Fifth Amendment responsibilities exists here. If this court were to hold that the VA payments to
veterans do not constitute assistance to Bob Jones, it might be contended that
the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government's payments to veterans attending the university. Each time the VA approves an application for benefits to be
used at Bob Jones, it extends a benefit to whites which it cannot grant to some
blacks. While this is an outcome of private discrimination, it is clear that no
[not?] only is the government prohibited from authoring state sponsored discrimination, it is also prohibited from acquiescence in the discriminatory practices of public and private entities which participate in the federal program.
It is . . . axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or promote
private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.
Id. a t 608 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
142. The court felt that it "should avoid a statutory interpretation which raises
constitutional questions if there is a reasonable reading of the statute which does not raise
those issues." Id.
143. See notes 135-136 and accompanying text supra.
144. 45 C.F.R. 4 86.2(g)(2), (4) (1975).
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(racial discrimination in general) to the context of title IX (sex
discrimination in education) they lose much of their validity and
persuasive force. The court stated, as the second underpinning for
its holding, that the legislative history of title VI revealed no
congressional intent to leave veterans' educational benefits outside the scope of the statute. Yet, as discussed above, the legislative history of title IX tends to indicate that Congress intended
federal aid paid directly to individual students, and this would
include veterans' educational benefits, to be excluded from the
scope of that statute.145
The applicability of the third underpinning to title IX is a
more complex issue. The federal government is as undoubtedly
barred by the Fifth Amendment from aiding or participating in
unconstitutional sex discrimination as it is from aiding
unconstitutional racial discriminati0n.l" Yet under currently
applied constitutional doctrine, virtually all racial discrimination, where the requisite government involvement is present and
where minority races are denied rather than accorded the benefits
. ~ ~the
~ same time,
of the discrimination, is u n c o n ~ t i t u t i o n a l At
many forms of sex-based discrimination are not constitutionally
infirm.148These disparate consequences flow from the United
States Supreme Court's treatment of race as a "suspect classification" in Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
analysis,149coupled with its refusal to accord the same treatment
to sex-based or sex-related classifi~ations.~~~
145. See notes 121-127 and accompanying text supra.
146. Compare Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (race) and Simkins v. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963)' cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964)
(race) with Fronteiro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex).
147. For a review of the United States Supreme Court's treatment of race discriminaCASES
AND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW690-753 (9th ed. 1975).
tion, see G. GUNTHER,
148. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U S . 57
(1961); Leighton v. Goodman, 311 F. Supp. 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. St.
Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV.675 (1971).
149. See note 147 supra.
150. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). But cf. Fronteiro v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
While sex-based classifications are not treated as inherently suspect, as are racial
classifications, neither are they accorded the wide deference the courts generally accord
nonracial classifications under the "rational basis" test, the lower tier of the traditional
two-tiered equal protection model. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.L.
REV.1 (1972). Rather, the Supreme Court now appears to apply an intermediate test to
sex-based classifications, one that in its rigor falls somewhere between minimal scrutiny
and strict scrutiny. A sex-based classification, in order to withstand this intermediate
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An additional difference separates racial discrimination from
sex-based discrimination. The courts have, either expressly or
implicitly, treated elimination of the former as a national priority
of the highest order.151Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to
say that the interest in eliminating racial discrimination, as the
highest national priority, must prevail over all other interests
Elimination of sex-based diswhen a conflict is ~navoidab1e.l~~
crimination, although increasingly important as a national goal,
has not yet been identified as a priority of the same stature.15J
Unless and until the proposed Equal Rights Amendment is ratified, it remains unlikely that the interest in eliminating sex-based
discrimination will be judicially vaulted over other interests that
must necessarily, in varying contexts, conflict with that interest.
The difficult questions that remain are whether and how these
identifiable differences between the legal status of racial discrimination and the legal status of sex-based discrimination should
affect the application of title VI cases such as Bob Jones University u. Johnson154to the construction of title IX.
The court indicated in Bob Jones that federal assistance to
or participation in, even indirectly, racially discriminatory conduct would be unconstitutional as violative of Fifth Amendment
guarantees? That assertion, however, remains valid only where
the discrimination itself, once the requisite government involvement is identified, is constitutionally impermissible.'" But as
level of scrutiny, " 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation t o the object of the legislation . . . .'"
Reed v. ~ e ' e d404
, U.S. 71, 76 (197l)(quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920)).
151. See, e.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1167 (D.D.C.)(three-judge
court), aff 'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Bob Jones Univ. v.
Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 607-08 (D.S.C. 1974), aff 'd mem., No. 74-2164 (4th Cir., May
28, 1975).
152. Judge Leventhal, speaking for a three-judge district court, stated:
There is a compelling as well as a reasonable government interest in the
interdiction of racial discrimination which stands on highest constitutional
ground, taking into account the provisions and penumbra of the Amendments
passed in the wake of the Civil War. That government interest is dominant over
other constitutional interests to the extent that there is complete and unavoidable conflict.
Green v. Connally, 330 I?. Supp. 1150, 1167 (D.D.C.), aff 'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971).
153. Compare Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (sex) with Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (race) and Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), afd
mem. sub norn. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (race).
154. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., No. 74-2164 (4th Cir., May 28,1975).
155. Id. at 608.
156. See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
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noted above, virtually all racial discrimination is unconstitutional.'" Thus a court would perhaps be justified in the racial
context in giving a broad definition, as the Bob Jones court did,
to "receiving federal financial assistance" in order to avoid raising questions concerning the constitutionality of federal grant
statutes.158If, however, as is much more likely with sex-based
discrimination, the assisted discriminatory conduct can pass constitutional
the federal assistance cannot be interdicted, and the reason for an all-encompassing view of what constitutes federal assistance disappears. Thus, to the extent a statute or regulation is promulgated or employed to interdict constitutionally permissable discrimination-as are, to a large extent,
title IX and HEW's title IX regulation160-a primary reason leadSimkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 938 (1964); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge
court).
157. See note 147 and accompanying text supra.
158. See notes 141-142 supra.
159. See notes 148-150 and accompanying text supra.
160. Speaking of title IX, HEW has stated that "[wlhen Congress specifically prohibits certain discrimination by statute, a higher standard may well apply than under the
Fourteenth Amendment." Letter from Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of HEW, to Representative James G. O'Hara, July 2, 1975, in 1975Hearings on Title IX Regulation 486-89.
Much of the conduct prohibited by HEW'S title IX regulation, even assuming the
requisite government involvement, could pass constitutional muster. It is doubtful, for
example, that a court would intervene on constitutional grounds in a university's decision
to provide-in the form of additional police surveillance, locks, or lighting-greater security for women's dorms than is provided for men's facilities. The regulation, however,
prohibits such discriminatory conduct. 45 C.F.R. § 86.32(a) (1975). Also, the regulation
interdicts the following practices that appear either sufficiently related rationally to a
valid objective or sufficiently removed from actual sex discrimination to avoid invalidation on Fifth Amendment grounds: assigning students in a college of education to a
student-teaching experience a t an elementary or secondary school that treats the studentteacher in a manner inconsistent with any portion of HEW's regulation, id. $ 86.31(d);
failing to insure that companies interviewing and recruiting on campus are not tainted
by sexist hiring practices, id. 4 86.38(a); providing sex education courses for college undergraduates on a sex-segregated basis, id. $ 86.34(e); failing to establish formal grievance
procedures for complaints of sex discrimination, id. § 86.8; using a sex-based quota system
to insure that an equal number of men and women are enrolled in a ballroom dance class,
id. § 86.34; failing to insure, if the university lists off-campus housing as a service to its
students, that the housing available to one sex is comparable in quantity and quality to
the housing available to the other sex, id. 5 86.32(c).
It should be noted in this context that HEW's regulation to implement title VI,
particularly the regulation's prohibition of discrimination and segregation in education,
has been viewed by the courts as coextensive with constitutional prohibitions. See United
States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 848 (5th Cir. 1966), decree
corrected, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) ("HEW'S standards are substantially the same as this Court's standards. They are required by the
Constitution . . . ."). This is in contrast to HEW's Title IX regulation, which in many
areas extends beyond constitutional prohibitions. Again, this difference in the title VI
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ing a court to construe federal assistance broadly in order to avoid
the possibility of Fifth Amendment violations is not applicable.
The above analysis focuses primarily on one of the two identified differences between racial and sex-based discrimination:
the larger scope constitutionally permitted the latter. Analysis of
the impact of the second difference-the relatively higher priority
accorded the interest in elimination of racial discrimination-is
discussed in conjunction with other considerations in section
III,B,4 below. Analysis of the first difference, however, indicates
that the reason leading courts to construe title VI broadly, including the language "receiving federal financial assistance," does not
to an indefinite but perhaps substantial extent apply to title IX.
d. Implications of HEWS definition of "receiving federal
financial assistance. " If HEW's broad definition of "receiving
federal financial assistance" is sustained against the first ultra
vires challenge, arguably every program of any educational institution enrolling students receiving federal aid or benefits will be
subject to HEW regulation. This is so even i f the second ultra
vires challenge-that title IX was drafted to regulate specific
programs and not entire institutions-prevails and HEW's regulatory scheme is modified accordingly. The reason for this broad
impact can be readily outlined. A student receiving veterans'
educational benefits, for example, uses a portion of those benefits
to meet tuition costs. Tuition payments enter the general fisc of
the university; from there the money is used to support the university's diverse programs and activities. Thus, every program
supported by tuition payments of students can be viewed as receiving federal financial assistance. Consequently, only those programs-revenue-producing intercollegiate athletics a t some
colleges, for example161--not receiving tuition funds would remain
free from federal intervention under the title IX regu1ati0n.l~~
regulation and the title IX regulation probably results from the different constitutional
standards applied to sex-based and racial discrimination. See notes 146-153 and accompanying text supra.
161. Testifying in the 1975 hearings, one coach explained:
[EJach school is somewhat different in the athletic property they own. At the
University of Illinois anything that is owned by the Athletics Association, which
is a complete and separate corporation from the university, has been paid for
100 percent in one of two ways-either by revenue raised by sports or by contributions from interested alumni.
1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 54 (testimony of Bob Blackman, University of
Illinois).
162. HEW has adopted the position outlined here. Letter from Caspar Weinberger,
Secretary of HEW, to Representative James G. O'Hara, July 2, 1975, in 1975 Hearings
on Title IX Regulation 486-89.
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3. Institutional us. programmatic application of title I X and

the title IX regulation
HEW'S title IX regulation, as has been noted above, prohibits sex discrimination in all programs or activities of an educational institution if any one of those programs receives or benefits
from federal financial assistance.Ifi3In short, its approach is institutional, not programmatic, with the regulation imposing more or
less specific mandatory guidelines and prohibitions on programs
that traditionally do not receive federal funding such as athletics,'" housing,1B5health services,'" and scholarship administration.'" The ultra vires issue is thus whether HEW exceeded the
scope of title IX and its authority thereunder when it sought to
regulate entire educational institutions rather than only those
specific programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance.
a. The language of the statute. Both the language of the
statute and the way in which that language was chosen tend to
indicate that Congress intended title IX to be applied on a programmatic, not an institutional, basis. The statute's prohibition
is limited on its face: It extends only to any "education program
or activity."Ifi8Further, one remedy provided for enforcement of
the prohibition-fund termination-must, pursuant to statutory
mandates, be "limited in its effect to the particular program, or
part thereof," in which discrimination is found.lBgAlso, it seems
that had Congress desired to prohibit sex discrimination throughout an entire institution, it could have readily found its way to
the word institution or recipient in its drafting efforts. Indeed, in
another section of title IX, one dealing with discrimination
against the blind, Congress used such language, clearly revealing
an intent to cover entire institutions: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of blindness . . . be denied admission
in any course of study by a recipient of Federal financial assistance for any education program or activity . . . ."170
Also, when drafting the sex discrimination provisions, Congress had before it bills obviously extending to entire institutions.
-

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
45 C.F.R. 4 86.41 (1975).
Id. § 86.32.
Id. 4 86.39.
Id. 4 86.37.
20 U.S.C. 4 1681 (Supp. IV,1974); note 1 supra.
20 U.S.C. 4 1682 (Supp. IV, 1974); note 2 supra.
20 U.S.C. 4 1684 (Supp. IV, 1974).

-

-
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Of the three measures introduced in Congress prohibiting sex
discrimination in education-Senator Bayh's original amendment ,171 the Nixon administration bill, and Representative
Green's rnea~urel~~-the
first two were drafted to cover entire institutions.17' Only Representative Green's measure, the measure
adopted by Congress, limited the scope of the prohibition to an
"education program or activity."175Given the alternatives that
were presented to it, Congress's selection of the more narrowly
drawn measure lends strong support to the view that Congress
intended to limit the application of title I X to programs rather
than extend it to entire institutions.
6. The legislative history. As with the legislative history
pertaining to the first major ultra vires challenge, the legislative
history relevant to a determination of the second challenge is
sparse. Unfortunately, it is also ambiguous and inconclusive. The
following dialogue between Representatives Waggoner and
Steiger and Representative Green, the author and floor manager
in the House of the measure that became title IX, constitutes the
only portion of the congressional debate directly pertinent to the
scope of the sex discrimination ~ r o h i b i t i 0 n . l ~ ~
Mr. Waggonner. Let me clarify a little bit better the point
I am trying to make and that is this: This [title] applies, apparently, only to those programs wherein the Federal Government
is in part or in whole financing a program or an activity?
Mrs. Green of Oregon. With Federal funds.
Mr. Waggonner. That is what I mean, Federal funds.
Mrs. Green of Oregon. It is really the same as the Civil
Rights Act in terms of race.

171. Amendment 398 to S. 659,92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG.REC.30156-57 (1971).
172. H.R. 5191, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
173. H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
174. Sen. Bayh's measure prohibited sex discrimination in "any program or activity
conducted by a public institution of higher education, or any school or department of
graduate education, which is a recipient of Federal financial assistance for any education
program or activity . . . ." Amendment 398 to S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG.
REC.30156-57 (1971). The administration bill prohibited sex discrimination by a "recipient of Federal financial assistance for any education program or activity . . . ." H.R.
5191, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
175. H.R. 7248,92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); see note 37 and accompanying text supra.
176. Senator Bayh made the following comment on the floor of the Senate concerning
his proposed bill, but since the comment is little more than a paraphrase of the language
of the bill, its illuminative value is marginal a t best: "The effect of termination of funds
is limited to the particular entity and program in which such noncompliance has been
found . . . ." 118 CONG.REC.5807 (1972).
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Mr. Steiger of Wisconsin.
.

.

a

...

.

Mr. Chairman, let me proceed along the line of the gentleman from Louisiana, and let me ask the gentlewoman from
Oregon (Mrs. Green) for clarification on what I thought I heard.
In title [IX] the gentleman from Louisiana asked relating
to a program on [or?] activities receiving Federal financial assistance, and under the "program on [or?] activity" one could
not discriminate. That is not to be read, am I correct, that it is
limited in terms of its application, that is title [IX], to only
programs that are federally financed? For example, are we saying that if in the English department they receive no funds from
the Federal Government that therefore that program is exempt?
Mrs. Green of Oregon. If the gentleman will yield, the answer is in the affirmative. Enforcement is limited to each entity
or institution and to each program and activity. Discrimination
would cut off all program funds within an institution.I7'

Representative Green's response-"With Federal funds."
-to Representative Waggonner's inquiry may be read as an affirmative response with a clarification, in which case the statement would be indicative of a congressional intent that title IX
apply only on a programmatic basis. Such a reading is plausible
but not absolutely required. Representative Steiger's attempt
to clarify the issue would have been helpful but for an unfortunate phrasing of his queries. It should be noted that he asks two
questions. An affirmative answer to the first would indicate an
institutional application; an affirmative answer to the second, a
programmatic approach. Representative Green answered in the
affirmative, but it is not clear to which of the two questions she
is responding. The statement following t h a t response-"Enforcement is limited to each entity or institution and to each
program and activity."-tends to indicate that Representative
Green was thinking in terms of programmatic application. Yet
the sentence immediately following-"Discrimination
would
cut off all program funds within an institution."-points in turn
towards an institutional application.
The portion of the dialogue immediately following this exchange, however, only brings confusion to an area not yet clarified:
Mr. Steiger of Wisconsin. So that the effect of title [IX]
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is to, in effect, go across the board in terms of the cutting off of
funds to an institution that would discriminate, is that correct?
Mrs. Green of Oregon. The purpose of title [IX] is to end
discrimination in all institutions of higher education, yes, across
the board, but we do have the three exemptions to which I
referred.178

Representative Green's response, which gives wide scope to the
fund termination remedy, is puzzling in light of the provisions of
her bill limiting the effect of termination to the "particular program, or part thereof," in which discrimination is found.I7% any
event, both Representative Steiger's final query and Representative Green's response may be read as revealing a congressional
preference for an institutional application of the statute. Nevertheless, consideration of the dialogue in toto leads one to no conclusion other than that the relevant legislative history is hopelessly ambiguous.
c. Interpretation of title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Both proponents and opponents of HEW'S title IX regulation
resort to a crucial Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case construing
title VI, Board of Public Instruction v. Finch,IR0
in support of their
respective positions on the scope of the application of title IX.
The case, therefore, merits consideration in some detail?
Over a period of several years, from 1965 to 1968, a small
segregated Florida school district and HEW engaged in negotiations in an effort to arrive a t an acceptable desegregation plan for
the school district. The pace of progress was slow, however; the
faculties and studentries of the schools in the district remained
racially segregated. Finally HEW broke off the negotiations as
fruitless and commenced administrative proceedings under title
VI. An HEW hearing examiner found that the school district's
progress toward student and faculty desegregation was "inadequate" and therefore entered an order terminating "any classes
of Federal financial assistance" administered by HEW and two
other federal agencies. HEW adopted the order. lR2
The order was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
178. Id.
179. See id. at 39098-99.
180. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
181. For an instance where opponents of the regulation resort to the Finch case see
19x5 Hearing on Title IX Regulation 242, 245 (prepared statement of American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities). HEW cites the Finch case
in the comments accompanying the final title IX regulation. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975).
182. 414 F.2d at 1070-71.
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where two major issues were presented for review: (1) whether
HEW's blanket termination of federal funds, coupled with a failure to make programmatically oriented findings of discrimination, violated section 602 of title VI, a section virtually indentical
to section 902 of title IX; and (2) whether that issue was properly
cognizable on appeal since it had not been raised in the administrative hearing below.IR3
In order to resolve the procedural issue, the circuit court felt
compelled to examine in part the substance of HEW's action. It
noted that since the school district received federal funds under
three separate federal grant statutes, a possibility existed that the
school district operated one or more of those programs on a nondiscriminatory basis and that such a program was not tainted by
court
discrimination in other federally funded acti~ities.'~VI'he
felt that it could not "assume, contrary to the express mandate
of [section 602 of title VIJ, that defects in one part of a school
system automatically infect the whole."IR5The congressional intent expressed in section 602 was that the effect of fund termination be limited, or "pinpointed," to programs operated discriminatorily in f a ~ t . ~ ~ ~ e cthe
a u"action
se
of HEW in the proceedings
below was clearly disruptive of the legislative scheme" and because of other defects in HEW's administration of the title VI
sanction, the court felt compelled to proceed to the merits and
resolve the first issue. IR7
On the merits, the court refused to permit HEW to treat a
program as not in compliance with title VI, and thus subject to
fund termination, unless that program was shown to be in fact
administered in a discriminatory manner or infected by a discriminatory environment.
If the funds provided by the grant are administered in a
discriminatory manner, or if they support a program which is
infected by a discriminatory environment, then termination of
such funds is proper. But there will also be cases from time to
time where a particular program, within a state, within a
county, within a district, even within a school (in short, within
a "political entity or part thereof"), is effectively insulated from
otherwise unlawful activities. Congress did not intend that such
a program suffer for the sins of others. HEW was denied the
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1071-72.
at 1071, 1074.

at 1074.
at 1075.
at 1075-76.
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right to condemn programs by association. The statute prescribes a policy of disassociation of programs in the fact finding
process. Each must be considered on its own merits to determine
whether or not it is in compliance with the Act. . . . Schools
and programs are not condemned enmasse or in gross, with the
good and the bad condemned together, but the termination
power reaches only those programs which would utilize federal
money for unconstitutional ends.t88

The court recognized that a program not operated in a discriminatory fashion may still be so affected by a discriminatory
environment as to render it violative of title VI. But since the
contrary possibility exists, HEW cannot presume discrimination.
Rather, before taking action in any case, HEW must "make findings of fact indicating either that a particular program is itself
administered in a discriminatory manner, or is so affected by
discriminatory practices elsewhere in the school system that it
thereby becomes discriminatory." lag
In conclusion, the Finch case establishes two fundamental
principles: (1)Title VI's prohibitions and sanctions apply to programs, not recipient institutions or entities. (2) No program violates title VI unless, as a matter of fact, it is operated discriminatorily or is affected to some unspecified degree by the discriminatory environment of the operating institution. These principles
take on added significance in light of HEW'S reliance on the
Finch case in the comments accompanying its final title IX regulation. lgO
HEW uses the Finch case in those comments, however, in a
particularly puzzling manner. The Department first quotes the
"particular education program" language of section 902 of title
IX that limits the permissible effect of fund termination and
pledges to interpret that section consistent with section 602 of
title VI. HEW then concludes that "[tlherefore, an education
program or activity or part thereof operated by a recipient of
Federal financial assistance administered by the Department will
be subject to the requirements of this regulation if it [the program or the recipient institution?] receives or benefits from such
assi~tance."~~'
HEW attempts to support the broad coverage of
the regulation, however, by quoting language from the Finch case
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. a t 1078.
Id. at 1079.
40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975).
Id.
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dealing with the "tainting" effect of discrimination: "Federal
funds may be terminated under title VI upon a finding that they
'are infected by a discriminatory environment . . . . ,9192
Although puzzling at first, HEW'S use of the Finch case reveals an additional premise underlying the institutional approach
of the title IX regulation: If any program, whether federally
funded or not, is operated discriminatorily, all other programs of
the operating institution, including those receiving federal assistance, are so tainted by the discrimination as to render them
violative of title IX. (The first presumption-the "benefit"
theory-has been mentioned before and will be analyzed in more
detail later.)lg3That use, however, arguably also constitutes
abuse, for while the Finch court agreed that one program may in
fact be tainted by the discrimination in another program, it forbade HEW from presuming that taint. Whether or not a funded
program is so tainted by discrimination as to render it violative
of the statute is in all cases a question of fact."' If HEW cannot
presume that discrimination in one program taints all programs
either as an aid in establishing a statutory violation or as a basis
for terminating federal financial assistance, it is difficult to imagine how the Department could be justified in using that presumption to expand the scope of its regulatory powers.
Nevertheless, one of the first commentators on title IX
argued that the tainting presumption should be used to expand
the scope of the statute's prohibiton.lg5If a federally funded pro?

192. Id. The entire paragraph reads:
Title IX requires in 20 U.S.C. 1682, that termination or refusal to grant or
continue such assistance "shall be limited in its effect to the particular education program or activity or part thereof in which noncompliance has been
found." The interpretation of this provision in title IX will be consistent with
the interpretation of similar language contained in title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d-1). Therefore, an education program or activity or
part thereof operated by a recipient of Federal financial assistance administered
by the Department will be subject to the requirements of this regulation if it
receives or benefits from such assistance. This interpretation is consistent with
the only case specifically ruling on the language contained in title VI, which
holds that Federal funds may be terminated under title VI upon a finding that
they "are infected by a discriminatory environment . . ." Board of Public Instruction of Taylor County, Florida v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir.
1969).

Id.
193. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra; notes 229-236 and accompanying
text infra.
194. See notes 184-189 and accompanying text supra.
195. Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53 TEX. L. REV.103, 111-12 (1974).

176

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

gram is tainted by discrimination in another, nonfunded program, both programs should be "considered part of the same
program for purposes of bringing the latter [nonfunded program] within the reach of Title IX."lg6 Nothing supports such a
proposition, however, other than a desire to give title IX as wide
a scope as possible. The statute prohibits sex discrimination not
in discriminatory programs that taint funded programs but only
in "any education program and activity receiving Federal financial assistance." lg7 To bring nonassisted but tainting programs
within the scope of title IX7s prohibition, as the commentator
is
suggested and as HEW has done with its regulatory scheme,1gR
to extend that prohibition beyond the limits set by Congress.
As a practical matter, however, the regulation promulgated
by HEW for funded programs may serve as a useful, although not
mandatory, guideline for nonfunded programs. If an educational
institution is unable to effectively insulate discriminatory practices in a nonfunded program, those practices may taint a funded
program to such an extent that the latter must be deemed in
violation of title IX and thus subject to fund termination or other
remedial action.lg9To avert fund termination, the institution
would be obligated to end the discriminatory practices in the
nonfunded program, even though that program is outside the
scope of title IX's prohibition. If the institution elects such a
course, guidelines or regulations promulgated by the federal department or agency holding the fund termination ax and outlining the steps necessary, in the agency's view, to eliminate discrimination in the nonfunded program would be a useful aid to
the institution.
Before leaving the Finch case and its implications for title IX
interpretation, an argument advanced by proponents of the regulation and designed to circumvent the programmatic approach
and evidentiary standard mandated by that case should be considered. The Center for National Policy Review has contended
that the "limitations on the scope of section 902, the statutory
sanction for noncompliance with section 901, are independent
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. 20 U.S.C. 4 1681(a) (Supp. IV, 1974); note 1 supra.
198. The commentator correctly recognized that HEW'S cite to the Finch case in its
comments accompanying the (then only proposed) regulation "indicates that tainted [but
nonassisted] programs fall within the Secretary's ban, . . ." Comment, supra note 195,
a t 113.
199. For an excellent discussion of the ways in which one program can taint another
program offered by the same institution see 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 194-96
(memorandum prepared by Center for National Policy Review).
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from and do not limit the general prohibition of section 901."200
The Finch case, which mandated a programmatic approach, only
construed title VI's equivalent of section 902, not section 901, and
is therefore not dispositive. Section 901 is "properly interpreted
as prohibiting discrimination based on sex in all aspects of a
school program which is receiving Federal financial assistance .7'201
Two cases, Lau v. Nicho1s2O2and Bossier Parish School Board v.
Lemon,203support the institutional interpretation of section 901
found in HEW's title IX regulation.204
Severe difficulties plague this argument. First, the Lau and
Bossier Parish decisions are doubtful authority for institutionwide application of title IX. In Bossier Parish, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the racially segregated school district
"accepted federal financial assistance . . . and thereby brought
its school system within the class of programs subject to the section 601 prohibition against di~crimination."~"In Lau, the Supreme Court reviewed the challenge of Chinese-speaking students
to the San Francisco School District's failure to provide bilingual
training for a substantial proportion of its students who could
speak only Chinese. In its decision for the students, based on
section 601 of title VI, the Court referred to "the educational
program7' of the school
the concurring opinion also
approved HEW's title VI guidelines that spoke of the "educaClearly, the Court's
tional program offered by a school distri~t."~"
approach was unitary or institutional and not programmatic in
the narrow sense. Nevertheless, in both cases, the courts had no
need to distinguish between an institutional and a programmatic
application of title VI: Both the defendant school districts received federal funds into their general fiscs which were then used,
presumably, to finance all their activities and programs.2nxAny
1975 Hearings on Title I X Regulation 191, 193.
Id. a t 192-94 (emphasis omitted).
414 U.S. 563 (1974).
370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967).
1975 Hearings on Title I X Regulation 193.
370 F.2d a t 852.
414 U.S. a t 568.
Id. a t 570 (Stewart, J., concurring), quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 11595 (1970).
208. The Bossier Parish School District received federal funds under 20 U.S.C. $ 6
236-241 (1970). 370 F.2d a t 851. Such funds, commonly referred to as "federal impact
funds," are paid directly to the school district; the use or purpose of the funds is not
restricted beyond the requirement that they be used for "operation of schools." OFFICEOF
EDUCATION,
HEW, ADMINISTRATION
OF PUBLIC
LAWS81-874 & 81-815: TWENTY-FIRST
ANNUAL
REPORTOF THE COMMISSIONER
OF EDUCATION
5 (1971); see 20 U.S.C. § 240 (1970). In fact,
part of the policy of the statutes providing for "federal impact funds" is to replace funds
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distinction between programs would have been immaterial since
all programs and activities comprising the total offering of the
defendants would have been subject to section 601 even under a
rigorous programmatic approach. In short, since the courts did
not have the institutional vs. programmatic issue before them, it
is simply unknown what they would have done had less than all
of the programs offered by the school districts received federal
assistance. Only when confronted with such a factual setting
would a court be required to determine the scope of section 601
of title VI, or section 901 of title IX, and choose between an
institutional and a programmatic application of the statute.20g
Also, the Center's argument that section 901 is broader in
application than section 902 inevitably leads to the conclusion
that Congress prohibited some offensive conduct without provid~'~
ing a truly effective means of enforcing that p r o h i b i t i ~ n .That
lost to a school district's general fund when private, taxable property within the district
is acquired by the federal government and thus removed from the tax rolls. 20 U.S.C. (5
236 (1970). The San Francisco School District also received, among other types of federal
aid, "federal impact funds." See Brief for Petitioners a t 45, Lau v. Nichols, 416 U.S. 563
(1974); OFFICEOF EDUCATION,
HEW, ADMINISTRATION
OF PUBLIC
LAWS81-874 & 81-815:
OF THE COMMISSIONER
OF EDUCATION
38 (1974) (San FranTWENTY-FOURTH
ANNUAL
REPORT
cisco School District received $1,592,330 in "federal impact funds" in 1973).
209. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with such a factual setting
in Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969); it opted for "programmatic specificity." See notes 184-189 and accompanying text supra.
210. Section 902 of title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. IV, 1974), provides that compliance with the rules, regulations, and orders promulgated pursuant to that section may be
effected by (1) fund termination or (2) "any other means authorized by law." The latter
phrase refers to judicial, as opposed to administrative, remedies. Application of the identical phrase in title VI has been explained in these terms:
[I)f the violation cannot be corrected informally, HEW may submit a recommendation to the Department of Justice to commmence appropriate proceedings, one of which may be an action under state or local law. A Justice Department suit may seek judicial enforcement of assurances by the recipient of federal
financial assistance that its program is in compliance with Title VI and its
regulations; such assurances are required in every application for financial assistance as a condition of approval or continuance and specifically provide that the
United States has a right to seek judicial enforcement of them.
Slippen, Administrative Enforcement of Civil Rights in Public Education: Title VI, HEW,
and the Civil Rights Reviewing Authority, 21 WAYNE
L. REV.931, 933 (1975) (footnotes
omitted). The extent of the use, if any, of the second remedy could not be ascertained.
Nevertheless, all commentators agree that, in the title VI context, fund termination or
the threat thereof has been the device that has rendered title VI such an extremely
effective tool in eliminating discrimination in federally assisted programs. See, e.g., Dunn,
Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REV.42 (1967);
Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second
Decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI.L. REV.742,756-58 (1974); Slippen,
supra. In addition, see 117 CONG.REC.30408 (1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh: "The civil
rights experience . . . indicates that the very possibility of such a sanction [fund termina-
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Congress would engage in such a hollow exercise cannot be accepted without difficulty. Further, and perhaps most persuasively, there is no significant difference in the language of the
two sections to indicate that "education program" in section 901
has a meaning different from "education program" in section
902.211Standard rules of statutory construction mandate that
identical phrases in such close proximity within a statute, absent
some clear indication to the contrary, be given the same meaning
and scope.212Finally, if section 902 applies to specific programs
while section 901 applies on an institution-wide basis, as the Center argues, HEW's rulemaking power under section 902 would
appear to be inadequate to its purpose-effectuation of the provisions of section 901. Section 902 authorizes HEW (or any other
federal department or agency) to promulgate regulations only
"with respect to" education programs receiving federal financial
assistance administered by HEW.213In other words, HEW cannot
promulgate rules covering anything other than a section 902
"education program." If that term in section 902 is more limited
in scope than the same term in section 901, HEW's authority is
necessarily limited to a point where it cannot fully effectuate the
provisions of section 901. It is doubtful that Congress intended
such a limitation on HEW's rulemaking power. If it did, the
institutional approach of HEW's title IX regulation is clearly
ultra vires. If it did not, the scope of section 902, which under the
Finch case requires programmatic ~pecificity,~'~
must be construed as identical to the scope of section 901.
d. T h e program-as-institution issue. The preceding portions of section III,B,3 evaluate, in the somewhat complex form
tion] has worked wonders."). The last cite and quotation is typical in its indication that
to the Congressmen involved in passage of title VI and title IX fund termination constitutes the effective remedy of those statutes.
211. The Center for National Policy Review points up minor differences in the language of the two sections but fails t o identify and ascribe any significance or materiality
to those differences. 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 194.
211. See, e.g., Schooler v. United States, 231 F.2d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 1956) ("In the
absence of anything in the statute clearly indicating an intention to the contrary, where
the same word or phrase is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be
used in the same sense throughout . . . ."); Hull v. American Wire Weavers' Protective
Assoc., 159 F. Supp. 425, 430 (N.D. Ohio 1957) ("It is a settled canon of construction that
words used in one place in an enactment have the same meaning in every other place in
the statute."); Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman, 76 N.J. Super. 90, 105, 183 A.2d 788, 796
(1962) ("It is a general rule of construction that where a word or a phrase occurs more
than once in a statute, it should have the same meaning throughout unless there is a clear
indication to the contrary.").
213. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. IV,1974); note 2 supra.
.
214. See notes 184-189 and accompanying text supra.
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in which both proponents and opponents of the regulation have
cast the issue, whether HEW's institutional approach is ultra
vires. A much simpler formulation of the issue merits consideration: Is "education program" as that term is used in title IX
coextensive with the total and combined educational activities of
a school district, college, university, or other educational institution? In other words, does a university, for example, provide an
"education program" or does it provide numerous separable programs and activities? Obviously, if a university were deemed to
offer a unitary program, the ultra vires issue considered in this
section would be resolved; there would be no difference between
an institution and a program and no disparity between the institutional approach of HEW's title IX regulation and the programmatic approach that many argue title IX mandates.
Some indirect authority for thg institution-as-program view
exists. In two title VI cases, Lau u. Nichols215before the Supreme
the
Court and Bossier Parish School Board v. Lern~n~~Qefore
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the courts approached the defendant school districts as if they provided a unitary education program. But as noted in the previous discussion of these two
cases,2i7since both defendant school districts received federal
funds into their general fiscs, the courts had no need to distinguish between a unitary and a separable approach to the programs offered by the school districts.
Other title VI cases, and most groups involved in construing
or analyzing title IX, including HEW, view the various facets and
activities of an educational institution as separable, distinct education programs. This is certainly the approach of opponents of
the regulation. One university president testifying during the
1975 congressional hearings on the title IX regulation stated that
"program or activity is subsumed in the institution. My institution has 100 programs or activities . . . . The intent of the statute
is 'any education program or activity,' and not any i n s t i t u t i ~ n . " ~ ~ ~
HEW also, both in the regulation and in extrinsic statements, has
adhered to this approach. For example, HEW's Secretary Weinberger, in testifying before Congress in the 1975 hearings, spoke
of the "educational programs or activities of a school district,
215. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
216. 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967).
217. See notes 205-209 and accompanying text supra.
218. 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 260-61 (testimony of Dr. Dallin H. Oaks,
President, Brigham Young University).
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institution of higher education, or other entity which receives
Federal funds for any of [its] programs."21g The regulation
speaks of the "educational programs or activities" which a recipient institution operates.nRIn addition, commentators reviewing
title IX have indicated that a single institution may and generally
does operate various separable education programs and that an
athletic program within a high school, for example, constitutes an
education program as that term is used in the statute.221
The latter approach to title IX-that separable education
programs exist within a single institution-appears correct. Congressmen in the debates preceding passage of title IX generally
used the word program to refer not to the total program of an
educational institution but to smaller-scale activities within the
institution.222The following query of Representative Steiger is
typical: "For example, are we saying that if in the English department they receive no funds from the Federal Government that
therefore that program is exempt?"223Also, cases construing title
VI, some decided prior to enactment of title IX, recognize that a
school district or university operates various education programs
within the total scope of its activities.224In Board of Public Instruction u.
for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals identified a t least three separate education programs receiving federal aid within a school district accused of racially
discriminatory conduct: a program for the education of children
of low-income families, a program involving supplementary education centers, and a program for the education of adults with no
college degree.226It should be noted that the court equated "program" with "federal grant statute," basing that view on the manner in which congressmen used the word in debates preceding the
enactment of title VI.227
In conclusion, it appears that the term "education program"
from title IX is not equivalent in scope to an entire educational
219. Id. at 436, 438.
220. 45 C.F.R. 4 86.9(a) (1975). See also id. 4 86.4(a), 4 86.11, 4 86.31(a).
221. See, e.g., Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing
Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53 TEX.L. REV.103, 107-13 (1974).
222. See, e.g., 117 CONG.
REC.39256 (1971) (Representative Steiger); id. (Representative Waggonner); id. at 30406 (Senator Dominick).
223. Id. at 39256.
224. See, e.g., Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969);
McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M. 1970).
225. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
226. Id. at 1074.
227. Id. at 1077-78.
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institution; rather, it refers to such educational activities as an
athletic program, an English department, ROTC, or a program
outlined in and funded by a federal grant statute. The argument
that the term "education program" is unitary and refers to the
total activities of a school district or university is therefore unavailable to support the institutional approach of HEW's title IX
regulation. But, as noted above, HEW has not resorted to that
argument in support cf its position.228
e. Presumption vs. fact: the "benefit" theory and institutional application of title IX. As noted above, proponents of an
institutional application of title IX have urged a "benefit" theory
in support of their position: Federal assistance received by one
program benefits all other programs within the institution by
"releasing" institutional funds-which would otherwise go to the
recipient program-for use in those other programs.2zgIt should
be noted that this theory is based (1)on a fundamental presumption concerning the effect in fact of federal assistance on education programs and institutions and (2) on the assumption that the
term "receiving federal financial assistance" includes the concept
of "benefitting from." The latter aspect of the theory was treated
above.2NThe portion of the comment that follows analyzes the
first characteristic of the "benefit" theory: the presumption that
federal assistance received by one program benefits all other programs within the institution.
Board of Public Instruction v . Finch231established that
whether prohibited discrimination exists in or taints a program
is a question of fact. Likewise, for purposes of applying either title
IX's prohibition or its sanctions, it appears evident that a program must receive in fact-or, if the broad construction is
adopted, be benefited by in fact-federal financial assistance.
Any other approach would render meaningless the limitation inherent in the phrase "receiving federal financial assistance." Further, if a program does not actually receive federal aid, and therefore falls without the scope of section 901, no authorization appears for administrative regulation of the program. The statutory
authorization for department or agency rulemaking in section 902
limits that rulemaking power to effectuation of section 901's proh i b i t i ~ n Therefore,
.~~~
to the extent HEW's title IX regulation
-

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

--

See notes 219-220 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 117-120 and accompanying text supra.
414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
20 U.S.C. 8 1682 (Supp. IV, 1974); note 2 supra.
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covers education programs and activities that are presumed to
but do not in fact receive-or perhaps, benefit from-federal financial assistance, it is ultra vires.
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the "benefit" theory's
presumption sufficiently conforms to actuality that HEW's institutional approach may be viewed as warranted. The very nature
of federal assistance to many education programs, however,
greatly reduces the accuracy of HEW'S presumption and thus the
validity of its institutional approach. Many federal grant statutes
are subject to what is termed a maintenance of effort requirement.233Under such a requirement, the sponsoring institution is
obligated to continue funding a t historic levels a program newly
receiving federal funds. The net result is twofold: (1)The federally assisted program receives an actual increase in its funding,
and (2) the sponsoring institution does not have "released" to it
institutional funds it may then expend on nonfunded programs
and activities.
The ubiquity of maintenance of effort provisions is demonstrated by an examination of chapter 28 of title 20, United States
Code, the chapter dealing with federal assistance to institutions
of and students enrolled in higher education. A cursory survey
revealed eleven separate provisions requiring maintenance of effort.234Of those eleven, seven appear in the Education Amendments of 1972, the same Act containing title IX.235More significant than the total number of such provisions, however, is the
amount of federal assistance subject to them. For example, one
provision covers all grants to students in attendance at institutions of higher education and requires participating colleges and
universities to continue spending "in its own scholarship and
student-aid program, from sources other than funds received
[from the federal government], not less than the average expenditure per year made for that purpose during the most recent
period of three fiscal years preceding the effective date of the
agreement, . . ."236 This wide use of the maintenance of effort
concept throughout federal education assistance programs demonstrates the inaccuracy of the presumption of the "benefit"
theory underlying HEW's institutional approach. Given that sig233. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. $$ 1022, 1088c (Supp. IV, 1974).
234. 20 U.S.C. $$ 1022, 1023, 1054, 1070e, 1088c, 1134s(c), 1135b-7 (Supp. IV, 1974);
20 U.S.C. $$ 1087b, 1119c-2(c), 1124, 1125 (1970).
235. 20 U.S.C. $5 1022,1023,1054,1070e, 1088c, 1134s(c), 113513-7 (Supp. IV, 1974).
236. 20 U.S.C. 4 1088c (Supp. IV, 1974).
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nificant inaccuracy, HEW should not be permitted to use the
presumption as a basis for expanding the scope of its regulatory
power.

Policy arguments for and against a narrow construction of
title IX

4.

Proponents of HEW'S title IX regulation argue that certain
practical considerations, as well as a general view of the interests
served by the authorizing statute, mandate a broad construction
of the statute and support the institutional approach of the regulation. First, a narrow construction of title IX, one requiring programmatic application of both the statute's prohibition and its
sanctions, would be difficult to administer. The enforcing federal
department or agency would be required to identify which education programs receive federal funding and which do not. The
resultant need to trace federal funds would impose an extraordinary work load on federal officials in addition to requiring excessive federal intervention in school affairs. These burdens would
render title IX ineffective as an antidiscrimination device.237
Experience indicates that these fears of administrative difficulty are probably excessive and unwarranted. After the Finch
case imposed a requirement of programmatic specificity on HEW
in its title VI enforcement efforts,23ssome commentators forecast
that the administrative burden would be unbearable? "Administratively, a program-by-program determination of discrimination will place an enormous burden upon an understaffed
agency. . . . The added work load will only exacerbate the difficult conditions and essentially render section 602 ineffective
when applied t o school de~egregation."~~"hat forecast has
proven to be wrong. HEW has followed the Finch requirement^,^^'
the administrative burdens have not been unbearable, and title
VI has continued to be an extremely effective desegregation device.242A contrary result of programmatic application of title IX
is unlikely.
237. See, e.g., 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 217 (statement of Holly Knox,
NOW); id. at 296 (testimony of Dr. Norma Raffel, Education Committee, WEAL); id. at
416 (prepared statement of Nellie M. Varner).
238. See notes 184-189 and accompanying text supra.
239. See, e.g., 23 VAND.
L. REV. 149 (1969), noting Board of Public Instruction v.
Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
240. Id. a t 155.
241. Slippen, Administrative Enforcement of Civil Rights i n Public Education: Title
VI, H E W , and the Civil Rights Reviewing Authority, 21 WAYNEL. REV.931,941-42 (1975).
242. See note 210 supra.
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Also, the nature of federal education assistance programs
makes unmanageable administrative burdens and additional federal intervention less than probable. Most federal education assistance programs already require recipient institutions to make
reports, keep records, and provide for such other "fiscal control
and fund accounting procedures as may be necessary to insure
proper disbursement of and accounting for funds made available
under" the federal grant statute.243With such "fiscal control and
fund accounting procedures," reports, and records already in existence, it appears that federal officers engaged in title IX enforcement can readily identify the specific programs receiving
federal aid. Equally important, they can do so without additional
intervention into school affairs.
Proponents of the regulation raise a second argument. Title
IX was drafted to serve the interest in eliminating sex discrimination in education. The statute should therefore be construed
broadly and given the widest possible application in order that
that interest may be fully ~indicated.~"
Those who make this
argument, however, overlook the readily apparent fact that Congress, when enacting title IX, was also concerned with the protection and vindication of other interests, certain of which in some
contexts necessarily conflict with the interest in eliminating sex
discrimination in education. Of those countervailing interests,
Congress was perhaps most concerned with the interest in preventing the destructive intrusion of federal control into the autonomous and pluralistic world of American higher education.245
Throughout the debates preceding enactment of title IX, congressmen, including the chief sponsors and proponents of the
title,246repeatedly articulated an "unwillingness to require the

G.,

243. 20 U.S.C. 8 1054(c)(l)(D)-(E) (Supp. IV, 1974);
id. §§ 1022(2)-(3),
1023(a)(l), 1070e(c)(l)(A),1070e-l(c)(l)(A),1134s(c)(2),1135b-7(a)(4), (6); 20 U.S.C. 88
1087b(3)-(4), 1119~-2(~)(3)-(4)
(1970).
244. See, e.g., 2975 Hearings on Title ZX Regulation 324 (prepared statement of Dr.
Bernice Sandler); id. a t 163-64 (testimony of Representative Mink).
245. See, e.g., 117 CONG.REC.37784 (1971) (Representative Quie); id. a t 37786-87
(Representative Sheuer); id. a t 37790 (Representative Erlenborn); id. at 39249 (Representative Erlenborn); id. a t 39254 (Representative Conte). See generally Buek & Orleans, Sex
Discrimination-A Bar to a Democratic Education: Overview of Title ZX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 6 CONN.L. REV.1, 5, 16 (1973).
246. During debates, Representative Green made the following comment:
I think we ought to respect the autonomy of the institution and let the institutions determine their priorities and needs. The Federal Government has no
business saying if you do not do what we have decided is important-you would
not get any funds. I say if we follow this course, we will have more and more
Federal control, which is what I want to avoid.
117 CONG.REC.37785 (1971).
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federal government to intrude into determining the nature of private educational organizations, and a conviction that one of the
essential elements of a free society is the diverse nature of its
educational institution^."^^^
Even prior to the title IX debates, however, Congress recognized and translated into legislation this interest in preserving
the autonomy of American higher education from federal regulation and control. When Congress significantly increased federal
assistance to education with the Higher Education Act of 1965,
it provided:
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United
States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the
curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of any educational institution, or over the selection of library
resources by an educational institution.248

Thus, in the title IX debates, congressmen could accurately describe the policy against federal intervention in higher education
as “long- tand ding.""^
That policy, and the interests it seeks to further, influenced
the drafting of title IX. This is most readily seen in the various
It
exceptions provided to the general prohibition of section 901.2.50
can also be argued, however, that Congress, realizing that title
IX's prohibition would necessarily operate to reduce the pluralism and autonomy of American education, carefully limited the
scope of that general prohibition itself. This argument is supported in part by Congress's rejection of the institutional approach of Senator Bayh's original amendment and the Nixon
administration bill in favor of the more narrowly drawn bill introduced by Representative Green.251
In conclusion, with title IX Congress sought to serve legitimate interests in addition to the primary interest in eliminating
sex discrimination in education. The narrowing provisions of the
statutes should not be viewed, therefore, as accidents of the legislative process needing to be corrected or glossed over by a regulatory scheme insensitive to all of the interests that Congress sought
247. Buek & Orleans, supra note 245, at 5; see note 245 supra.
248. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 804(a), 79 Stat. 1270.
The current prohibition against federal control of education is found at 20 U.S.C. §
1232a (Supp. IV, 1974).
249. 117 CONG.REC.37784 (1971) (Representative Quie).
250. 20 U.S.C. 4 1681(a)(1)-(6)(Supp. IV, 1974); note 1 supra.
251. See notes 35-53 and accompanying text supra.
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to accommodate. Since Congress was not single-minded when it
drafted title IX, it would be a mistake for a court and an ultra
vires act for an agency to disregard the limiting features of the
statute and apply it in a single-minded fashion.

IV. CONCLUSION

It should be remembered that the previous sections are concerned with what Congress did and not with what Congress could
have done or can do now. Some of the most astute critics of
HEW'S title IX regulation have conceded that had Congress chosen to regulate all programs and activities of an educational institution even though only one of those programs received funding,
it could have done so within constitutional stricture^.^" Yet if
Congress, with its title IX prohibition, did not cut such a wide,
leveling swath-and the short conclusion of the preceding sections is that i t did not-it should be of no little concern that a
segment of government largely immune from the democratic processes has advanced without authority its regulatory power over
a part of society as crucial as education.
252. See 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 261 (Dr. Dallin Oaks, president,
Brigham Young University).

